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Recent events in Sudan and South Sudan led to the creation of a peace support 
operations model (PSOM) simulation of the area for peacekeeping planning and analysis. 
This led to questions about how to best use the PSOM and how the PSOM reacts to 
certain inputs. 
Major outputs of the PSOM are population consent for the rulers and the 
opposition. Designed experiments systematically explored the sensitivity of consent to 
initial values, showing that initial consent has a strong influence on ending consent, and 
initial consent values of zero do not allow consent to increase over time. Consent changes 
for a given course-of-action decrease over time, meaning that a course of action that leads 
to strong improvement initially will result in less improvement in later periods. The 
stochastic mode does not affect consent outcomes. An experiment varying courses of 
action for five factions in the contested Abyei region at the border of Sudan and South 
Sudan showed that rules of engagement have a significant effect on security and consent 
values but cluster around a few ending points. Consent values stabilize after about 30 
model turns. These findings may be useful for military planners or for those developing 
training simulations for officers and leaders. 
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The peace support operations model (PSOM) is a valuable platform for modeling 
insurgencies and non-traditional combats. While it has only primitive force-on-force 
modeling tools, it also models the consent of the populace toward governing and 
insurgent forces and how secure they feel during a conflict. Because the best way to end 
an insurgency is to make the population feel safe and happy with the government, this 
simulation is far better than a traditional wargame at modeling successful strategies for a 
peacekeeping or occupying force (such as in Iraq or Afghanistan). 
This thesis examines a PSOM scenario intended to portray the potential 
difficulties of a mission to assist Sudan and/or South Sudan, both looking at the scenario 
itself and the PSOM model. The interaction of peacekeepers with seven active ethnic 
groups, each with an active faction, along with two governments is an opportunity to 
create both a rich and realistic training environment and to model an actual possible 
future conflict/peacekeeping area to help U.S./allied forces in such an endeavor. 
Initial tests show that the stochastic mode in PSOM affects only the casualties of 
units, not the consent and security value changes in the population. This means that it can 
safely be ignored in simulations that are focused solely on those outputs. It is, however, 
possible that if there were more combat units in a smaller area, where extensive casualties 
could occur, that changes in unit strength could make the stochastic mode valuable for 
simulations not focused on casualties. 
Another discovery is that setting initial consent or security values to zero can 
result in unexpected behavior. Although the values are displayed over a range from zero 
to ten, in the underlying calculations of the program they actually run from negative 
infinity to positive infinity, and an initial setting of zero means it is almost impossible to 
raise to the point where consent or security values influence population activity.  
A small experiment explored how consent values change over time for two 
scenarios: the “protect” scenario, where all sides protected their own population, and the 
“withdraw” scenario, where all military forces withdrew from combat completely. The 
 xvi 
results show that the changes are based on the initial input values. In other words, a given 
course of action does not cause consent to always drop by one point or to always move to 
a particular level given enough time. Instead, it would drop by an amount apparently 
related to how close the initial value was to six. Starting values close to six resulted in 
large changes to consent over time, starting values that were very high or very low 
resulted in much smaller changes to the consent values. This appears to be related to the 
nonlinear nature of the underlying calculations. 
A larger experiment varied the force protection (FP) and rules of engagement 
(ROE) for each of five different factions, adding “combat,” “rampage,” “genocide,” and 
“half genocide” to the “protect” and “withdraw” scenarios for a total of six courses of 
action. A nearly orthogonal and balanced design was augmented with the base case 
scenario to specify 513 different scenarios to simulate. From the results, it was 
determined that the rules of engagement have a significant effect on security and consent 
values. When one faction is engaged in genocide against another faction, the defending 
faction and the peacekeepers gain more consent with “loose” rules of engagement, 
perhaps because this allows more pro-active combat to protect civilians. Security was 
also increased with higher ROE values, probably for the same reason. 
The genocide scenario also revealed an issue with the program. In some cases, the 
population of a region declined below zero, causing the program to halt. Perhaps this can 
be fixed in future versions of PSOM. 
While it was expected that a wide variation in rules of engagement and stances 
would result in a wide variety of outcomes, a parallel plot of the results shows there are 
only a few different outcome values for each faction. There was still a wide variation 
between those few values, but with few exceptions, consent values did not “spread out” 
over a large number of values, but instead clustered on a few points. This may be because 
the metric measured was “change in consent” rather than consent, but it is more likely 
that there is some sort of “step” system in the program, or that the nonlinear nature of the 
internal numbers is only allowing changes if some key value is breached.  
 xvii 
Finally, a simulation output analysis technique called MSER (mean squared error 
reduction) was used to determine that consent values became stable after about 30 turns 
with no changes in faction stances or activity. This could be useful for creating a 
baseline/starting consent for a new scenario. It could also be useful for comparing several 
possible reactions quickly. If the user programs a specific set of stances for a faction and 
runs the scenario to turn 30, they will have a good idea what it will look like at any turn 
after 30. As long as you are only looking at consent values, a single run will suffice 
because of the limited nature of the stochastic mode. 
In summary, this thesis provides guidance to potential users of PSOM in several 
ways. It identifies considerations that a user should consider when setting up a scenario, 
such as the composition of map squares and the choice of initial values for consent and 
security. It gives guidance for running the model, such as when it may be valuable to run 
in stochastic mode instead of deterministic mode, and how many model turns are required 
to reach stable consent and security values for the many factions. It illustrates how a 
designed experiment can be used to gain insights about the scenario itself. All these may 
be useful for a military planner either evaluating a future area of operations or seeking to 
develop a training simulation for officers and leaders, with the ultimate goal of seeking to 
win the hearts and minds of the locals in an insurgency or ethnic conflict. 
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In 2012, at the request of U.S. Navy Lt. Cmdr. Ryan Klaahsen of the U.S. Marine 
Corps’ Combat Development Command, Dr. Jeffrey Appleget assigned his Wargaming 
class at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) the task of creating a wargame based on 
stopping a mass atrocity, instead of the normal wargames of force-on-force combat. The 
students decided to model the Abyei region on the border between Sudan and South 
Sudan, and the “peace gaming model” was so successful that it was presented at the 
International Association of Peace Training Centers Conference in Helsinki.1 
There are many reasons why the states of Sudan and South Sudan, and the Abyei 
region claimed by these states, are important to the U.S. military, especially the U.S. 
Africa Command (AFRICOM). First is the public interest: the Darfur Genocide drew a 
lot of public attention and calls for the United States to intervene, and even a U.S. vice 
president called for intervention.2 Second is the location of Sudan and South Sudan, 
bordering (among other nations) Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Third is the obvious assertion that instability in one nation can lead to 
instability in neighboring nations. This is backed up by accusations made by the 
government of Chad that Sudan was supplying arms to rebel groups in Chad.3 
Also, the Sudan/South Sudan situation of multiple tribal groups, concern by tribal 
groups regarding favoritism by government groups and possible genocide, is similar to 
the concerns in other areas of interest to AFRICOM, and any lessons learned by studying 
a simulation of possible events in Sudan would be likely to also apply to other nations 
                                                 
1 Kenneth Stewart, “Waging Peace, NPS Students Develop Peace Gaming Model,” news release, 
Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System, last modified September 28, 2012, 
http://www.dvidshub.net/news/95488/waging-peace-nps-students-develop-peace-gaming-model#. 
UmF7hUDiXm4. 
2 Wasil Ali, “US Presidential Contender Calls for Military Intervention in Darfur,” Sudan Tribune, 
May 21, 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article21982. 
3 Lydia Polgreen, “Chad Says Sudan Is Arming Rebels,” New York Times, October 25, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/26/world/africa/26chad.html?_r=0. 
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with similar situations. For example, Somalia was torn along ethnic lines, and involved 
accusations of at least passive genocide—in the form of intentional deprivation of food.4 
Because of this success of the Abyei simulation, AFRICOM requested that 
TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) in Monterey (co-located with NPS) develop a 
simulation covering the greater Sudan area, including South Sudan. An area of 650 miles 
square was eventually selected for modeling purposes, encompassing Abyei, most of 
Darfur, the northern portion of South Sudan, South Kurdufan, and other portions of 
southern Sudan. This area contained portions of several possible hostile groups, while 
avoiding some of the more peaceful or distant areas that were unlikely to impact an 
Abyei flare up. While there are almost 600 ethnic groups5 in the target area, the 
simulation modeling effort narrowed it down to the seven largest and most likely to 
participate in hostilities. This resulted in some odd combinations to account for the total 
population. For example, the Nubian tribe was considered to be “Arab,” as it was located 
in Sudan and not generally rebelling against the Arab government, despite obvious 
differences in ethnicity and culture. 
Events in the region argue for continued interest and work on simulation. In June 
2012, Sudan invaded the Unity province of South Sudan.6 A year earlier, South Sudan 
invaded Heglig in the province of South Kurdufan.7 In addition to events near the Abyei 
region, in Darfur, the Messeria have clashed with the Rizeigat8 and the Murle continue to 
battle the Nuer.9  
                                                 
4 Charles Kenny, “Foreign Policy: Murder by Starvation,” National Public Radio, July 27, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/2011/07/27/138738773/foreign-policy-murder-by-starvation. 
5 “Sudan: Society and Culture,” Sudan.net, last modified October 16, 2013, http://www.sudan.net/ 
society.php. 
6 “South Sudan Reports Troop Invasion from North,” Voice of America, June 10, 2013, 
http://www.voanews.com/content/south-sudan-reports-troop-invasion-from-sudan/1678930.html. 
7 Lesley Anne Warner, “What Might South Sudan’s Invasion of Heglig Indicate about its Negotiation 
Tactics?” Lesley on Africa, April 26, 2012, http://lesleyannewarner.wordpress.com/2012/04/26/what-
might-south-sudans-invasion-of-heglig-indicate-about-its-negotiation-tactics/. 
8 Abdallah Abul Bashar, “Misseiriya and Rezaigatâ, Why Fighting Renewed?” Sudan Vision, July 23, 
2012, http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=212713. 
9 “UPDATED: Murle Revenge Attack on Luo-Nuer ‘Kills 23’ in Jonglei’s Akobo County,” Sudan 
Tribune, January 9, 2012, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article41226. 
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B. PSOM INTRODUCTION 
The peace support operations model was designed by the Defence Science and 
Technology Laboratory (DSTL) in the United Kingdom to model insurgencies and 
counter-insurgencies in a totally new way. Instead of focusing on combat losses and 
casualties, it focuses on the outcomes for the population living in the simulated region. 
The primary output measure of PSOM is the “population security” metric, which 
measures the population’s perception of safety from attack. Another main output is 
“population consent,” which measures the willingness of any given ethnic group to be 
ruled by a given faction. 
PSOM tracks unit casualties, unit readiness and training levels, the range at which 
units in different map squares can engage each other, intelligence-gathering efforts, and 
other combat parameters. Units are able to combat foes directly but are also able to 
provide security or conduct public works, which improve the lives of the population. 
Unsurprisingly, the latter activities sometimes are more effective at winning an 
insurgency than overt combat. Insurgent and local units are able to recruit additional 
members depending on the level of consent in the area. 
Earlier work involving PSOM includes a thesis10 that explores the utility of 
PSOM for training purposes, by assessing PSOM’s sensitivity to a large number of model 
parameters. The findings reveal that the operational risks, rules of engagement, and risk 
tolerance are analogous to doctrine, and that the results are overly sensitive to only a 
handful of parameters. The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation had a special 
issue about PSOM in April 2011.11 In this issue, they discuss how PSOM has a robust 
system for tracking logical changes in population attitudes toward factions based on how 
each faction provides for the needs of the population, including security as well as goods. 
However, humans are not logical, and so this set of articles also discusses a number of 
                                                 
10 Benjamin J. Marlin, “Ascertaining Validity in the Abstract Realm of PMESII Simulation Models: 
An Analysis of the Peace Support Operations Model (PSOM)” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2009). 
11Noel Wilde, “Special Issue: The Peace Support Operations Model: Stabilisation Strategy,” Journal 
of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology 8, no 2 (April 2011) 
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proposals to help PSOM better track real human responses, both using the Critique, 
Explore, Compare and Adapt model (CECA) and other methods such as new stances that 
units can use and using human in the loop analysis and manual changes to the base 
information. 
C. PURPOSE 
This thesis focuses on three areas of research concerning the internal workings of 
PSOM and how they affect both the designer of training simulations and the designer of 
simulations intended to model real-world locations. 
Firstly, exactly how important is the “stochastic” part of the model? Is it 
worthwhile for a simulation to be run, say, 50 times in stochastic mode to check the 
validity of the first run, or are effects minor? 
Secondly, how important are the initial values of inputs like “consent” and 
“security?” These are representations of attitudes of a broad population, which are often 
difficult to measure or survey. It is comparatively easy to count the number of troops and 
weapons different forces have available than to determine who has what support from the 
local population. 
Thirdly, how do the effects of various setting change over time? Most existing 
analysis of PSOM has focused on the effects after a set number of turns. This analysis 
finds that a policy’s effects decrease over time in PSOM. 
In addition to these research questions, Appendix B contains the lessons learned 
and provides a short user’s guide for new users of PSOM. 
D. RESEARCH SCOPE 
The research questions are addressed in the context of a single scenario. Even so, 
the biggest limitation on a research effort such as this is the sheer size of the experimental 
space. Even when restricting the study to a single PSOM scenario, there are nine factions, 
dozens of military or para-military units, and 144 grid locations each with at least one 
ethnic group represented as a “population agent.” Each unit has potentially 59 actions 
they can take, and there are hundreds of “background settings” that can affect the results. 
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To simplify the experiment, the scenario is restricted to just six factions, one 
being the United States/United Nations troops (denoted by U.S./U.N.) and one being the 
Sudan government. The other four factions are paired into a simple two-sided war, with 
the U.S./U.N. acting as peacekeepers. Rather than model every action each military unit 
can take, all units are given a similar set of orders, such as defending themselves, 
attacking foes, or genocide; the U.S. is given roles consistent with peacekeeping in that 
situation. There are six order sets in all, ranging from all forces withdrawing and not 
engaging in combat, to one or both sides engaging in genocide. 
Of the hundreds of background parameters that PSOM allows a scenario designer 
to change, only ten are varied in this experiment space. Previous studies had suggested 
that the rules of engagement (ROE) and force protection (FP) parameters were most 
important, so these parameters are varied for each of the five factions with military forces 
involved in the combat. 
One of the main differences between this thesis and other research analyzing 
PSOM or other peace support simulations is a focus on changes over time. Marlin’s 
thesis, for example, focuses on the results at static points in time, specifically at turn 12 
or turn 24.12 A reason this is important is that the curves that display changes in consent 
or security values over time frequently appear logarithmic. Most of the major change 
happens in the short run, and latter changes are much less noticeable. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II of this thesis describes the environment that military peacekeeping 
planners currently face. First is a discussion of the need for peacekeeping training and 
planning, and the challenges compared to traditional war games. Following this are a 
more detailed discussion of what PSOM is, followed by information about how PSOM 
works. Chapter II concludes with a description of the development and design of the 
PSOM Sudan scenario.  
                                                 
12 Marlin, “Ascertaining Validity in the Abstract Realm,” 96. 
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Chapter III explains the techniques and methodology used to analyze the 
functioning of the Sudan scenario in PSOM, starting with a look at how logical the 
consent output is for determining the success of training or planning. The chapter also 
includes a discussion of the nearly orthogonal and balanced (NOAB) design used to 
analyze the interactions of ten variables across six scenarios using only 3,078 data runs 
instead of millions.  
Chapter IV shows the data obtained from the computational experiments. First, it 
shows the results of a test of the effects of selecting the “stochastic mode” when running 
PSOM simulations. Then it displays the results of testing how the final consent values 
were related to the initial consent value inputs, intended to determine how important the 
accuracy of these inputs was to the proper running of the scenario. Finally, this section 
shows the results of the main scenario. It drills down into results for one tribe and 
attempts to determine the driving inputs for that tribe as an explanation of PSOM’s 
internal workings. It also illustrates a simulation technique suitable for determining when 
time-dependent simulation outputs, such as consent values, reach stable values. 
Chapter V summarizes the conclusions reached by this thesis and provides 
guidelines for further research. Appendix B contains some lessons learned for new users 




A. WARGAMING VERSUS PEACEKEEPING 
The United States has engaged in peacekeeping many times over our history. 
Major operations included Germany and Japan in World War II, Iraq, and arguably the 
local government support operations in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Absent the danger of 
commitment of Soviet troops in Korea or Vietnam, the last military conflict that 
presented actual danger to the United States was World War II. 
The U.S. and allied military planning (wargaming) staffs in World War II were 
obviously successful (or this report would be in German). There was significant planning 
for the peace as well, a “large number of U.S. and allied military forces in West Germany 
and the establishment of a strong constabulary force preempted most resistance.” Because 
of this, “no resistance of consequence emerged then or at any time thereafter,”13 in 
Germany. 
Similarly, Japan was relatively peaceful during its occupation. Initially, planners 
proposed using two full armies (the 6th and 8th) to either conquer Japan (operations 
Olympic and Coronet) or occupy it (operation Blacklist).14 The idea that two full armies 
would be required even if Japan surrendered indicates how serious MacArthur was about 
the dangers of occupying a former foe. 
However, by October 7, (WWII ended in Japan on September 2, 1945, with the 
signing of the surrender), the lack of resistance occasioned the transfer of the Marine Air 
Group stationed over Tokyo back to the Navy, and by October 15, the Air Group was 
                                                 
13 James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2003), 21. 
14 General Staff of Douglas MacArthur, “Chapter I: Prelude to Occupation,” in MacArthur in Japan: 
The Occupation: Military Phase, Volume I Supplement, ed. General Staff. (Washington, DC.: U.S. Army, 
Center of Military History, 1966). http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/ 
MacArthur%20V1%20Sup/ch1.htm. 
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primarily providing transportation (including mail and courier service) and doing training 
flights. Small wonder they were returned to the U.S. in June of 1946.15 
There was evidence of resistance, but it was often brawls between U.S. service 
members and local men over romantic liaisons with local women, or local people 
throwing rocks at the U.S. forces. Rail line sabotage, gunfire directed at U.S. trains, and 
cutting of telephone wires was also reported.16 
Vietnam was the first major “peacekeeping operation,” where the U.S. arguably 
failed. Part of the problem was the local leader, who used extreme reprisals, leading to a 
“self-fulfilling prophecy, as the insurgency gained momentum, Diem would get more 
repressive, which would create more insurgents.”17 Another issue was the U.S. question 
of whether to fight the North Vietnamese conventional army, the Vietnamese insurgency, 
or both. In 1964, General William Westmoreland decided that “the North Vietnamese 
were more important because they were a larger threat at the present than the 
insurgents.”18 Of course, we all know the historical result of this. “Although when we left 
Vietnam in 1973 the North Vietnamese army had retreated to its borders and there was 
peace for three years, the United States counterinsurgency mission in Vietnam failed.”19 
The insurgency won what the conventional forces could not. 
Arguably, one of the most important lessons of Vietnam was that military force, 
and military victories, would not win a war where insurgency was an element. The 
United States won every major battle. Our troops beat back the Tet Offensive, and 
massacred the troops that attacked during that fight. We forced North Vietnam to the 
                                                 
15 Henry I. Shaw, Jr., The United States Marines in the Occupation of Japan (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, 1969). 
16 Bertrand M. Roehner, “Assaults and Sabotage against Allied Forces during the Occupation of 
Japan,” University of Paris, June 17, 2007, http://www.lpthe.jussieu.fr/~roehner/ocj1.pdf. 
17 Christopher Millson, “Comparing Counterinsurgency Tactics in Iraq and Vietnam,” Student Pulse 3, 





negotiating table, and left as victors, only for the insurgency to return again, strong as 
ever, and take over Vietnam. 
There is some question of whether it makes sense to include Somalia in the list of 
U.S. occupations. The exact dividing line between U.S. occupations, United Nations 
(U.N.) occupations, and U.S. assisted U.N. occupations is fuzzy at best. However, even 
tangential U.S. involvement can expose our soldiers or Marines to risk, as this occupation 
proved. In addition, we have a responsibility to learn from any occupation, even if they 
are not ours, in order to best prepare our troops for insurgencies. The U.N. mandate in 
Somalia shifted from a desire to provide food aid to starving civilians, to an attempt to 
protect that food aid (when some factions started using control of food for political or 
genocidal aims), to a final major U.S. operation to capture one of the warlords 
performing such actions. In the resulting battle, facing a population that was clearly not 
friendly, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, and 84 were wounded, in an operation that inspired 
the movie “Black Hawk Down.”20 
U.S. operations in Afghanistan were not technically an occupation, but, like the 
operations in Vietnam, we provided trainers and troops to help a local government. With 
multiple factions (primarily government and U.S. versus the Taliban, Hekmatyar, and 
Haqqani extremist groups,21 the latter all conveniently on the border with the lawless 
Pakistani tribal areas) and multiple ethnic groups (Pashtun, Baluch, Hazara, Aimaqs, 
Nuristanis, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbeks),22 Afghanistan seems to be exactly the 
sort of problem PSOM was developed to deal with. However, even after more than ten 
years of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally support, Afghanistan 
was still unstable, and arguably worse than ever before.23 Afghanistan remained a war 
                                                 
20 “Ambush in Mogadishu Synopsis,” Frontline, September 29, 1998, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/ambush/etc/synopsis.html. 
21 Anthony H. Cordesman, Adam Mausner, and David Kasten, Winning in Afghanistan: Creating 
Effective Afghan Security Forces (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009). 
22 “Afghanistan and the War on Terror,” PBS News Hour, accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/afghanistan/map_flash.html. 
23 “Bleak 2013 Humanitarian Outlook for Afghanistan,” Integrated Regional Information Networks, 
January 2, 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/report/97162/bleak-2013-humanitarian-outlook-for-afghanistan. 
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zone, with U.S. forces facing multiple insurgent or locally dominant groups, but there 
were signs of hope. 
In Iraq, we again defeated every foe that fought us, while slowly losing the hearts 
and minds of the locals. Then in 2006 or 2007, General David Petraeus led a movement 
of local protection. This “awakening” led to a 90% reduction in attacks in the formerly 
fractious Anbar Provence (though there were still problems).24 
At this point, a wargame that only tracks military forces is great for winning a 
battle but not a war. The U.S. has not suffered anything as bad as Vietnam since, but in 
Iraq, we again saw the stark difference between winning battles and winning a nation. At 
the start of the Iraq war, we still had not developed models for the attitudes of the local 
population; nor did we have models for how our actions affected the local population, 
and their perception of our forces. We had no models to determine whether recruitment to 
terrorist or insurgency cells would replace losses to our attacks, or even surpass them. We 
had no models that could help us predict an awakening, much less encourage us to try to 
encourage one. 
This is the job of PSOM. 
B. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS MODEL 
The Peace Support Operations Model, PSOM2, has been developed to 
represent the complete range of civilian and military activity in a Peace 
Support Operation.25 
PSOM is a wargame designed for training military personnel in peacekeeping. It 
allows humans to control both the peacekeeping forces and the hostile forces, but also 
can support automated actions, primarily to test scenarios. 
                                                 
24 Alissa Rubin and Damien Cave, “In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict,” New York Times, 
December 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/world/middleeast/23awakening.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
25 Jon Parkman and Nathan Hanley. Peace Support Operations Model Functional Specifications 
(PSOM-FS) (UK: Ministry of Defence, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory/TR28869/1.0a, 2008), 
6. 
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A major difference between PSOM and other wargames is the inclusion of a 
population element. While PSOM will track military capabilities and casualties, it can 
also track the local economy, population movement (including optional migration), and 
how the local population feels about their leadership and security. This presents a unique 
and powerful opportunity to look at a scenario not from the military dominance 
viewpoint, but from the viewpoint of winning hearts and minds. Given recent experiences 
in Iraq among other locations, this is an important viewpoint to develop in our officers. 
PSOM has been used to train military officers from multiple nations in Monterey, 
CA. A group of officers from a single nation’s military work together to plan responses in 
a fictional scenario, trying to help bring stability to the imaginary nation, rather than just 
trying to defeat or destroy the hostile forces. In the words of the program, this exercise is 
intended to “prepare a Partner to support and contribute to multinational peacekeeping 
and peace support operations, which reduces the requirements and burden on the U.S.”26 
Three of the four courses offered by NPS in Peace Support Operations (PSO) are 
based around PSOM. The first two are an initial five-day training in PSO for an O-3 to  
O-6 officer team sent by the hosted nation, and a follow-on five-day course. Both courses 
use PSOM to give realistic feedback for the actual courses of action chosen by those 
officers, acting as a team, controlling units, and coordinating their efforts. In order for 
these sessions to work currently, a “red team” has to choose reactions of the hostile and 
other local active players. This is currently a shortcoming of the program, as it is labor 
intensive. The hope is to eventually develop some form of reactive algorithm that would 
allow the program to be run much more quickly and give the officer team being trained 
the ability to run the simulation again, choosing a different overall strategy. Ideally, since 
PSOM saves each turn of the simulation, the officer could go back to a mistake and re-
run the simulation from that point, starting with a different key choice. Such a capability 
would also allow the trainers to run the simulation a second time with different rules of 
                                                 
26 Naval Postgraduate School, “Peace Operations,” August 2012, 7, 
http://www.nps.edu/About/USPTC/Programs/Peace-Operations.html. 
 12 
engagement (ROEs), firepower ratings, or initial consent values, giving the officer team 
being trained a feel for how such changes would affect a real-world situation. 
Currently, PSOM training by NPS uses a simulation based on the fictional island 
nation called Yellowstone. The intent of using a fictional nation is to avoid offending 
anyone or having any questions about the reality of the simulation. Yellowstone has two 
islands, with five ethnic groups and a deteriorating government. Three U.N. brigades are 
sent in with the mandate to: 
 Support a secure and stable environment, 
 Support the constitutional and political process, and 
 Promote and protect human rights.27 
These objectives are similar to what would be expected for any peacekeeping 
mission. Similarly, the multiple ethnic groups and tension between ethnic groups are 
what would be expected in almost any U.N. peacekeeping mission, or indeed any 
stabilization mission for any governmental body (e.g., U.S. and coalition actions in Iraq). 
On the first day, the students develop a course of action (COA) and observe the 
training team entering the first day’s orders, asking questions as needed to understand the 
process. On the second day, the students are able to enter their own orders, though 
currently they provide verbal orders and the training team enters that as data into PSOM. 
The third day is the first day that the “red team” responds to the students’ entries, and day 
four is a turn where both teams are fully engaged. Finally, the fifth day is a day of 
analysis of lessons learned, an opportunity to teach based on the strengths and 
weaknesses observed during the session.28 
The question is this: Is PSOM just for peacekeeping training, or can it be used to 
consider real-world scenarios? If the latter, can it be used to examine different options in 
                                                 
27 Jeffrey A. Appleget, “Using the Peace Support Operations Model (PSOM) for UN Peacekeeping 
Operations Training and Education,” PowerPoint presentation, U.S. Partnership for Peace Training and 
Education Center, Naval Postgraduate School, August 2012, 7, http://www.ismor.com/29ismor_papers/ 
29ismor_appleget.pdf. 
28 Ibid., 9. 
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those scenarios? PSOM has been used to model both Iraq and Afghanistan, and has also 
assisted ISAF (NATO) planning in Afghanistan.29 “The PSOM’s game system is 
generally consistent with emerging U.S. and UK Concepts and Doctrine (for example, 
U.S. FM 3–24 (Counterinsurgency) and FM 3–07 (Stability Operations) and their 
approximate parallels JDP 3–40 and AFM COIN).”30 
It is also being used by Canada, Japan, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
Australia,31 in addition to nations that send officer teams to U.S. training utilizing PSOM 
at NPS.32 
To determine how effective PSOM is for real-world simulations (as opposed to 
training), we need to understand the program. Two top-notch sources for this were the 
PSOM Functional Specification, which was understandably helpful as it described what 
the program was intended to do, and how it was intended to do it, as well as a master’s 
thesis written by Major Benjamin Marlin in 2009.33 Marlin did a thorough job of 
analyzing the experiment space, showing how changing different inputs affected the 
outputs. However, in a computer simulation there are often situations with outcomes that 
are not self-evident. Both my work and that of Marlin, therefore, perform experiments 
and analysis to determine how the results of PSOM relate to the inputs. 
One of the goals of this thesis is to seek out and document such unexpected 
results so that future users of PSOM can anticipate these results, and either avoid them or 
take advantage of them. 
                                                 
29 Jeffrey A. Appleget, “PSOM Overview and Peacekeeping Operations Assessment Using PSOM,” 
PowerPoint presentation, U.S. Partnership for Peace Training and Education Center, Naval Postgraduate 
School, October 2011, 3. 
30 Appleget, “PSOM Overview and Peacekeeping Operations,” 5. 
31 Ibid., 8. 
32 Christopher J Nannini, Jeffrey A Appleget and Alejandro S Hernandez, “Game for Peace: 
progressive education in peace operations,” Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, 
Methodology, Technology 10, no 3 (2013): 283–296 
33 Marlin, “Ascertaining Validity in the Abstract Realm.” 
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C. HOW DOES PSOM WORK? 
In order to understand the experiment space, a brief explanation of the program’s 
inputs and operation are required. 
There are two main files in a PSOM scenario, a settings file and a scenario file. In 
addition, the user should supply a map, which can be given further attributes in the 
scenario file. 
The settings file determines global inputs like the size of map squares, the number 
of civilians represented by each “population agent,” and the “memory coefficient” value 
for the simulation. These give the program a great deal of flexibility. It can model a small 
area, with 5 KM squares and population groups of 100 or 1000—or it can model a nation, 
with 50 or 100 KM squares, and population groups of 10000. These values are stored as 
numeric values, so any reasonable value can be chosen. (There are some restrictions. For 
example, population groups should be integers.) 
While there are a large number of settings that can influence the scenario, the 
“memory coefficient” is a particularly interesting one for consent and security values. It 
determines how long a population agent “remembers” a positive or negative event. A low 
value of this setting results in quick changes to outputs as you change actions, while a 
high value leads to “stubborn” population agents who remember past wrongs for quite a 
while. 
The scenario file gives the actual information about the nation involved, including 
the ethnic groups, the population sizes and locations on the map, and the resources 
produced by labor. Other information includes governments, rebel/militia groups, what 
military and humanitarian units they have to promote their causes, where on the map 
those groups are located, how many map squares they can affect in terms of engaging 
foes, and (once determined) what mission they have. 
The scenario file is emblematic of the “two layer” philosophy of PSOM. An 
ethnic group might have its own leaders and militia, but the ethnic group population is 
part of the passive, civilian layer, while the militia is part of the active, military layer. 
When using PSOM for training, each faction is assigned to a single player, but the player 
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only controls the military units and humanitarian group units. The population groups 
react to conflicts using internal algorithms, so a population cannot be moved, used for a 
purpose, etc. Units are allowed to recruit locals to replenish combat damage however. 
The population provides outputs that are generally the victory conditions of a 
scenario. The two most commonly used are “consent,” which measures how willing an 
ethnic group is to be ruled by a given faction, and “security,” which indicates how safe a 
group feels. In addition, outputs representing humanitarian considerations, such as crime 
level or infrastructure, can be easily viewed and used as victory considerations. 
Inputs are many and varied. The security and consent values have to be given 
starting values, though in the absence of an inputted value for security it will be set to 10 
(meaning the population perceives no danger). Clearly, setting these numbers high will 
lead to a drop off in the early turns of a simulation regardless of the actions of the users. 
While each population agent has only one security number, there is one consent value for 
each population agent toward every faction. In other words, a given group of people will 
have an opinion about every possible group that seeks to control the nation or area. This 
makes sense, as any faction that might gain control will be of interest or concern to the 
population. Also, this helps determine possible recruitment by a faction’s military or 
infrastructure support units, because an unpopular faction will have difficulty replacing 
casualties or increasing unit size. 
Also, each map region has a production value associated with each owning 
faction. An owning faction produces, in each map square, the items in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Production factors in each map square 
Income Power Sanitation 
Potable Water Education Healthcare 
Shelter Information Internal Order 
Administration Food Transport 
Military Politics Gold 
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Each faction has a production value for each of these 15 items in each map 
square. However, many of these values are going to be zero; a faction with no presence in 
a region will have a zero production, and foreign (e.g., U.S. or U.N.) factions will have 
zero production with occasional exceptions. In addition, there is a current infrastructure 
value and a human capital value for each of the 15 production factors for each faction. If 
you have only five factions, you have to input 15*5*3=225 numbers per map square. 
This is a daunting task, but the numbers can be accessed in the Extensible Markup 
Language (XML) layer and altered en masse, either ported from a spreadsheet or set to a 
default value. 
These production values are part of the passive layer of PSOM, which means this 
production occurs regardless of the orders of the faction controllers. Note that foreign 
forces or agencies should have a zero production and current infrastructure, with rare 
exceptions, because those factions do not have local population/infrastructure/capital 
investments. However, the U.S./U.N. faction can produce these goods by having a unit 
engage in an action such as “Build/Humanitarian Aid > Build Infrastructure.” 
The ethnic groups themselves, in addition to the initial consent values, have an 
“ideology” setting which relates how groups feel politically. It uses a two-dimensional 
scale of personal and economic freedom, with authoritarian, libertarian, liberal, 
conservative, and centrist positions. Both dimensions are on a 100-point scale, allowing 
for differences between similar groups. Factions also have a setting using the same scale. 
Differences between a faction’s ideology and the ethnic group ideology have an effect on 
consent. 
The “Ethnic Groups” scenario entry also has demographics data (working age and 
school age percentage of population) and marginal gain coefficients for the fifteen 
production items (which determine the relative value to the faction of production or 
destruction of each of these goods). 
Another major portion of the settings file contains the “Relationships” that set the 
way that factions interact with each other. Note that this does not affect the way factions 
interact with the local populations, only their interactions with each other. Faction 
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relationships with local populations are determined by actions, either producing or 
destroying infrastructure, attacking the local population, or engaging in combat near the 
population, thus causing collateral damage to local people or property. 
Each faction has a relationship with each other faction, which can be “Attack,” 
“Cease Fire,” or “Protect.” The attack action in theory allows a faction leader to direct 
their forces to attack another faction. In practice, you can order a military unit to attack 
even friendly military units. The cease-fire action means you will not attack, and the 
protect action directs your troops to join the selected faction’s units in combat if they are 
attacked. 
Another portion of the faction relationships includes two options. One is to “Share 
Intel,” which allows a faction to see units on the map that the sharing faction has seen. 
The other is rather important but often overlooked. “Share Consent” means that actions 
one faction takes that affect consent will also affect the consent toward the other faction. 
This is useful if a quasi-military group is supporting the government but is a separate 
faction; its units are not part of the government faction. This can also be useful for 
modeling a U.S. force that is widely held by the local population to be supporting and 
allied to a local government. 
Finally, each faction has “ORBATS,” which is a term used for the military or 
humanitarian aid groups it controls. While the name is derived from “Order of battle,” it 
also includes a two-part order system to tell the units what to do each turn (these orders 
can be altered every turn if desired). 
Every unit has a “Faction,” “Leadership value,” “Reputation,” “Experience 
Value,” and “Casualty Tolerance.” These determine how effective a unit is and how it 
reacts to combat. Each unit also has a given “ROE,” “Force Protection” level, and a 
“Footprint” that determines how far away it can strike. The footprint value should be a 
multiple of the map square size, and most unit footprints are one map square. The unit’s 
location is also entered, and again can be changed each turn. 
The same page allows units to be given orders, in the form of a “Main Stance” 
and “Sub Stance.” The main stance is a group of actions of a common vein, designed to 
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keep the large number of orders available from overwhelming a user. For example, the 
“Build/Humanitarian Aid” main stance contains the “Build Infrastructure,” “Train 
Human Capital,” and “Provide Aid” options, which are all related, and different from the 
sub-stances available in the “Attack/Enforce” main stance. After inputting the stance, a 
commander also has to provide targets. Options are available to identify “Faction 
Targets” (which other faction you wish to aid or harm), “Sector Targets” (the 15 
production items), and “Population Targets” corresponding to the ethnic groups. Note 
that target is not always a hostile designation—the target of a “Protect” action will be 
defended from hostile actions, and the target of a “Build Infrastructure” will be the type 
of infrastructure improved. 
D. EXAMPLE OF SCENARIO BUILDING (SUDAN) 
The first step was to create a settings file; in this case, the team re-used the 
settings file from the Yellowstone scenario. The second step was to break the team up to 
work on the various inputs to the model. The major inputs were the military units for all 
sides, the ethnic group populations and locations, and the economic development factors. 
Of the three, I was assigned the work on the ethnic groups. 
In the Abyei region, the primary protagonists are the Messiria and the Dinka 
(Jieng). In Darfur, there are Fur, Messiria, and Rizeigat, with some Arab presence. North 
and east of Abyei is home to mostly Arab groups, and South Sudan is primarily Dinka, 
Nuer (Naath), and Murle. This is obviously an oversimplification of the 600 ethnic 
groups,34 but suffices to model major conflicts, even as it ignores situations like the 
Darfur violence between the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit, who all were nominally allies 
against the Janjaweed and Sudan government forces. In any case, the Zaghawa and 
Masalit territories are in west Darfur outside the area of the simulation. 
Many of the ethnic groups are minor groups that are affiliated with a larger tribe 
or faction (similar to how the thousands of Iraqi tribes are all part of a few tribal groups, 
some of which cross religious or ethnic lines). Sorting out which ones were important to 
                                                 
34 Sudan.net, “Sudan: Society and Culture.” 
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potential conflicts and, for that matter, were within the area being considered, was a 
challenge. A map of the many ethnic groups in Sudan appears in Figure 1. 
Figure 1.  Map of ethnic groups in Sudan35 
 
 
                                                 
35 Source: Michael Izady, “Ethnic Groups in the Formerly United Sudan,” map, Gulf/2000 Project, 
accessed December 28, 2013, 
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Sudan_Ethnic_Linguistic_sm.png. 
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A misunderstood element of the various conflicts is herd animals. In addition to 
arguments over grazing and watering rights, there is a lot of conflict over ownership of 
these animals for a more immediate reason. In many parts of Sudan/South Sudan, a man 
cannot get married until he has five cows or equivalent wealth. When a herder allows his 
animals to graze or take water from an area claimed by another faction, the other faction 
may claim part (or even all) of the herd because the cattle or camels contain the grain or 
water of the claiming faction. In addition, a quick (and accepted) way for a male to gain 
five cattle is to steal them from another tribe. Sometimes these raids involve fighting or 
even deaths, and even if the raid is bloodless, conflicts can arise afterwards. 
1. Darfur Region 
In the Darfur region, the major ethnic groups are Fur, Messeria, Rizeigat, 
Zaghawa, and Masalit.36 When the original fighting in Darfur started, the Fur, Zaghawa, 
and Masalit were being pressured by the Arabs (Messeria and Rizeigat) over grazing and 
water rights. The pro-Arab government supported the latter administratively. Eventually, 
the non-Arabs joined the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) and other groups rebelling against the Sudan Government in protest. 
However, as land pressure pushed the three non-Arab groups from their original farms, 
they began to fight amongst themselves. JEM was mostly representative of the Zaghawa, 
and the SLA took many fighters in the region from the Fur,37 meanwhile the Masalit, a 
smaller tribe besieged on all sides, created its own minor group.38 The borders of the 
simulation did not include the areas where most of the Masalit and Zaghawa live, so the 
simulation only had to include the Fur, Messeria, and Rizeigat. 
The original intent of the ethnic group compiler was to use only Janjaweed 
instead of splitting the Messeria and Rizeigat; however, they do represent different 
                                                 
36 “The Peoples of Darfur,” Cultural Survival, accessed October 16, 2013, 
http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/voices/32/peoples-darfur. 
37 Omer Ismail and Maggie Fick, “Darfur Rebels 101,” Enough Project, January 29, 2009, 
http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/darfur-rebels-101. 
38 “Cablegate: Chad/Sudan: Masalit Restiveness,” Scoop Independent News, June 7, 2007, 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0706/S01015.htm. 
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groups, even herding cattle versus camels. In addition, in 2008 the two groups began to 
fight over water;39 however, the groups have also fought because of differences in state 
support (the Rizeigat militia were generally placed in the Sudan Army, while the 
Messeria were mostly given policing jobs, which meant less weapons and equipment). 
Therefore, it made sense to make two different tribes. Also, the Messeria are engaged 
with the Dinka in Abyei (see the next section), but the Rizeigat are not in that area. 
2. Abyei Region 
The original area used in the game for peace, the Abyei region, only has two 
tribes claiming ownership, the Dinka and the Messeria. The Messeria had moved in and 
pushed a large number of Dinka out, and the region is now being disputed between Sudan 
and breakaway South Sudan. The region held a vote on whether to remain in Sudan or 
join South Sudan in October 2013.40 Unfortunately, the Messeria boycotted the vote.41  
The borders of the disputed region were re-drawn to make it smaller, which will 
reduce the number of (Pro-Sudan) Messeria. While this makes it more likely that the 
remaining region will decide to become part of South Sudan, the smaller area means that 
less of the oil-rich state would leave the economic control of Sudan. One important part 
of the referendum is that while only Messeria physically resident in the revised borders 
will be allowed to vote, all Dinka from the area will be allowed to vote. This is in 
response to allegations that many Dinka were forced from their homes in the region.42 
The region is not only oil rich, but also is home to a lot of the oil refining and 
piping infrastructure, which explains its importance and why the government helped the 
Messeria drive Dinka from the area before the Sudan/South Sudan split. 
                                                 
39 “Efforts Underway to Reconcile Two Darfur Tribes after Bloody Clashes,” Sudan Tribune, August 
22, 2008, http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article28373. 
40 “Ngok Dinka to Hold Abyei Referendum This Month,” Sudan Tribune, October 19, 2013, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48505. 
41 “Abyei’s Dinka vote to join South Sudan,” Al Jazeera, October 31, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/10/abyei-dinka-vote-join-south-sudan-
2013103193942652913.html. 
42 Sharon Otterman, “Court Redraws Disputed Area in Sudan,” New York Times, July 22, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/africa/23sudan.html?_r=0. 
 22 
3. South Sudan 
South Sudan was the first part of Sudan to rebel against the central government. 
While the conflict in Darfur was mostly along racial/ethnic lines (between government 
supported Arabs and rebelling ethnic Africans), the people in South Sudan were mostly 
Christian and/or Animist. This lent an air of religious conflict to the part of the succession 
war between the Christian South and the Islamic north. 
Other than the dispute in Abyei, the Dinka, Nuer, Murle, etc., are mostly at peace 
with Sudan. They formed a new nation peacefully after the referendum. There have been 
border skirmishes in both directions, however. 
Internally, there are still conflicts. The Nuer worry that the Dinka, as the largest 
tribe, will try to dominate the nation, and vigorously strive for representation and power 
in the government. Another complication is that the tribes were given land grants for 
grazing and farming by the British, and while the Dinka and Nuer were given large land 
grants, the Murle were not. This has led to competition and conflict between the Nuer and 
the Murle over grazing rights. 
4. Eastern Sudan 
The remainder of Sudan is mostly loyal to the Sudan government. Although the 
population is composed of many ethnic groups, including a large number of Nubians, I 
labeled all of them “Arab,” for purposes of the simulation. The Nubians, Koalib, etc., 
may not be ethnically Arab, but as they follow the main government, they act as though 
they are part of the “loyal population.” 
5. Process Notes 
Having determined the tribal groups, it remained to determine the actual 
populations and military units. While an attempt was made to make population units 
match the maps (see Figure 1 for an example), in reality the populations were mixed in 
almost all areas. In addition, having two or more ethnic group population agents in a grid 
square makes the PSOM simulation more active and therefore useful. If all grid squares 
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only had one ethnic group, then a conventional military simulation with military units 
guarding population agents would protect all population groups. 
Most of the military units were tribal groups or militia. The mounted Janjaweed 
were made more mobile, and only given to the Rizeigat and Messeria. One problem noted 
with the early versions of the scenario was that there was minimal actual conflict. The 
military units started in separate grid squares and did not come close enough to fight. 
This was solved in later iterations of the scenario by better initial placement of units and 
placing additional units for each faction. 
  
 24 




A. OUTPUT VERIFICATION 
It does not matter how many Viet Cong fighters American soldiers kill if the 
group just recruits more. While standard military simulations output casualties or damage 
to units and weapons platforms, PSOM provides additional outputs based on the 
perceptions of the local population. Because a peacekeeping or counter-insurgent mission 
is based as much or more on the outcome for the local population than on the number of 
hostile fighters killed or captured, such outputs are the real measure of effectiveness for 
such missions. 
The two primary “perception” outputs of the PSOM model are consent and 
security. Consent measures how willing the population of a given tribe or group (“Ethnic 
Group”) are to be ruled by a particular faction. Security measures how safe and secure 
each ethnic group feels from violence or lawlessness. Because we want the fighting to 
stop, the consent value (the willingness of an ethnic group to fight rule by a given 
faction) is used. This is despite the fact that security is defined as the key measure of 
effectiveness (MOE) in PSOM.43 
But how can we be sure that the consent output of the model represents what the 
population would actually tell us? At a gross level, we can run simulations of several 
inputs, and look at whether the outputs make sense. This is called Face Validation in the 
verification, validation, and accreditation (VVA) process, making sure the model is a 
representation of reality. 
The consent values change each turn of the simulation, but someone has to put in 
starting numbers. But how do they know if those numbers are right? How do they 
interpret results if the initial inputs are wrong? 
 
                                                 
43 Marlin, “Ascertaining Validity in the Abstract Realm,” 23. 
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B. DESIGN INTRODUCTION 
Modern simulation models can have very high processing requirements.44 The 
author recently created a Lancaster simulation in Microsoft Excel where each soldier was 
identical. This took mere seconds to re-run when data points were changed, despite the 
inclusion of friendly fire, air support, different types of troops, and a defender’s 
advantage. However, a simulation that tracks all soldiers in a conflict, lines of sight, 
weather, and logistics, or one that attempts to track the opinions of thousands of people 
from nine major tribal groups over 100 regions, has a much higher computer processing 
cost. Because of this, finding a “model of the model” or “metamodel”—a simpler 
mathematical formula that can predict the results of a simulation—can result in a huge 
savings in time and cost. In addition, if the timeliness of response is critical, it can save 
lives. Alternatively, such a design can allow analysts to pull many examples of different 
possible inputs, and analyze the outputs for trends. Because real life is complex, we may 
not know all of the inputs, or may have to rely on rough estimates. A robust model, based 
on an intelligent design, can allow you to see how resistant the conclusions are to minor 
inaccuracies in the inputs. 
There are a few designs a simulation expert can use to make a model of the 
model. One of the first types developed (called a full factorial design) uses all 
combinations of the high and low levels of each input. The problem with this is that if 
you have only 100 inputs, you need to run 2^100 simulations to develop your model, 
which takes about 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 times as long as a single 
run (to put this in perspective, if one run takes one second, 2^100 runs will take about 40 
billion trillion years). Another difficulty with this design is that by only looking at the 
high and low inputs, you will get very inaccurate estimates if the inputs effects are 
nonlinear. One soldier sent into battle will probably be killed, a million will have huge 
costs; a thousand might be just right, but if you only look at a single soldier and a million 
you will not see that. 
                                                 
44 “Developing Stressor Scenarios for Peace Operations through Experimentation,” news release, 
Naval Postgraduate School, November 26, 2012, http://www.nps.edu/About/USPTC/NewsEvents/ 
NewsArticles/2012/Developing-Stressor-Scenarios-for-Peace-Operations-through-Experimentation.html. 
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 Newer methods that are much more efficient include the Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube (NOLH) designs,45 and the Nearly Orthogonal and Balanced (NOAB) 
designs,46 which use larger numbers of variable input settings, and (by making sure that 
setting combinations are scattered in the high-dimensional space of interest), allows a 
similar level of analysis with far fewer runs. 
Using a PSOM model of the tribes and forces involved in the region of Sudan 
developed by the simulation experiments and efficient designs (SEED) Center at NPS, a 
set of hostile actions was developed, and then a set of U.S. responses was created. The 
hope is that this will allow the future creation of models to predict which U.S. responses 
will be most effective without running the full simulation for each combination of actions 
and responses. 
C. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
We examine two primary research questions. The first involves the initial 
transient effects of population dynamics for the PSOM Sudan scenario. Key measures of 
effectiveness for PSOM scenarios include the aggregate measures of various 
demographic groups, such as the aggregate level of favorability a particular tribe has for 
the U.S. forces. Previous studies involving PSOM have focused either on the levels or on 
the changes in levels from the initial values, after a small number of turns. Depending on 
the scenario, a turn can represent a day, a week, or even a month; each turn represents 
one month in the Sudan scenario. They have used efficient experimental designs to vary 
large numbers of inputs, and identify key drivers of the behavior of these MOEs at a 
particular snapshot in time. We augment past studies by conducting a detailed 
investigation of the transient behavior of the MOEs across a large number of turns. These 
results may improve our understanding of the PSOM model behavior in general, as well 
                                                 
45 Thomas M. Cioppa and Thomas W. Lucas, 2007, “Efficient Nearly Orthogonal and Space-Filling 
Latin Hypercubes.” Technometrics 49, no 1: 45–55 
46 Helcio Vieira Jr, Susan M. Sanchez, Karl H. Kienitz, and Mischel C. M. Belderrain, “Efficient, 
Nearly Orthogonal-and-Balanced, Mixed Designs: An Effective Way to Conduct Trade-Off analyses via 
Simulation,” Journal of Simulation 7(2013): 264–275 
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as specific behaviors for the Sudan scenario, by revealing how many turns are required 
for MOEs to stabilize, as well as the long-run values of these MOEs. 
In addition to the transient behavior analysis, we examine the sensitivity of the 
MOE transient patterns to the initial conditions, troop actions, and troop capabilities. For 
example, increasing a starting sentiment for a particular tribe might result in a variety of 
behaviors. It could move the MOE curve up by a fixed amount. The MOE could take a 
slightly different trajectory but converge to the same value. The MOE could take a 
radically different trajectory and converge to a very different end state. Because the 
transient analysis involves looking in detail at time-varying MOEs, we use an efficient 
experimental design to specify a relatively small, but carefully chosen, set of model 
variants. 
Rather than have units following some random or varied set of orders, courses of 
action for each side were designed to show a wide variety of actions, with most units 
doing the same (or similar) tasks. These designed scenarios give a broader range of 
alternatives, and will hopefully make the differences more noticeable, and capture any 
significant changes regardless of type of interaction. 
1. Measures of Effectiveness 
The primary measure of effectiveness we will be looking at is the “population 
consent” value of each population unit toward each faction. Population consent in PSOM 
is a number between zero and ten that represents how willing the population is for a given 
faction to be in control or in charge of the area the population lives in. Note that PSOM 
allows (in the faction settings) the person running the scenario to have population agents 
attribute the actions of one faction to an allied faction. For instance, in the Sudan 
example, the actions of the U.S./U.N. peacekeepers also could be regarded as 
representing the Sudan government, or the actions of the Arab faction could do so, since 
the Sudan government is dominated by Arabs. 
While the population consent runs from zero to ten in output, PSOM itself uses a 
number between negative infinity (output as zero) to infinity (output as ten). This helps to 
explain some of the ways that PSOM outputs behave. 
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A successful set of policies and actions by the U.S./U.N. peacekeeping force 
would raise the population consent towards the U.S. One of the thorny issues of a 
situation like this is that while you would expect that a decrease in population consent 
toward the warring factions would be positive for the U.S., in practice this could 
represent further exacerbation of ethnic tensions, which could lead to hostilities sparking 
up again once the peacekeepers depart. Consent toward the ruling government is another 
goal of the peacekeeping force, as perceived legitimacy of government will help get the 
population to turn to the government, instead of conflict, to deal with perceived injustice. 
Given the uncertainty in interpretation, the primary analysis in this thesis will be done 
only on the consent toward the U.S. 
Another important measure of effectiveness is the “security” value. In PSOM, the 
security value represents the population’s belief that they, their friends/family, and their 
property are safe from attack or other damage. Population security in PSOM is also a 
number from zero to ten, and also represents an internal value of negative infinity to 
infinity. A successful set of policies will result in high population security values for all 
population agents. If population agents of some factions have high security and agents of 
other factions have low security, it represents a failure of the peacekeeping force to 
protect all population factions. 
2. Courses of Action 
To attempt to determine best practices and test the outputs of the PSOM 
simulation, the author needed a varied set of courses of action (COAs). Five major 
choices were developed for the various forces, although, as described in Table 2, a hybrid 
set of actions was also simulated where the two sides used different levels of combat.  
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Table 2.   Courses of actions and descriptions 
Course of Action Purpose 
Withdraw Modeling of forces not interacting with foes or population. 
Protect 
Modeling of forces not interacting with foes, but positively 
interacting with population. 
Combat Modeling of forces engaging in conventional combat. 
Rampage Modeling of forces attacking infrastructure. 
Genocide Modeling of forces attacking non-combatant population. 
Combat/Genocide 
A hybrid case using “Combat” case for Messiria and Fur while 
using the “Genocide” case for Rizeigat and Arab. Modeling one 
side using Genocide tactics while the other does not. 
 
In the “withdraw” COA, each side would pull military forces back and not engage 
in combat. The purpose of this order set was to see how the Sudan Scenario would play 
out in the absence of actions by the various forces. It was a test of just population actions 
and background rules. In addition, the author wanted to see whether there were different 
results with military forces not engaged at all, versus  a scenario where no military forces 
were fighting, but they were “showing the flag,” protecting local population and 
infrastructure. 
In the “protect” COA, forces are directed to provide humanitarian aid, patrol, and 
protect their population and infrastructure. The U.S./U.N. forces are given a similar task, 
although they are protecting the population and infrastructure for all factions. The 
purpose of this order set was to verify that units performing protective and humanitarian 
functions would have a positive impact. In theory, this should produce better outcomes 
than the “withdraw” order set. 
In the “combat” COA, units are directed to either ambush any possible hostile 
forces, or engage in indirect fire attacks. The U.S./U.N. forces engage in 
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“protect/convoy,” in order to reduce combat operations. Because engaging in combat 
requires picking a side, they “target” the Messiria and Fur factions in the order set used. 
This is the only order set that requires the U.S./U.N. forces to choose a side. It is possible 
that the “Clear” combat order should have been used instead of ambush for higher 
intensity combat, but in an insurgency with U.S. forces present, the ambush represents a 
lower risk option for the sort of irregular forces involved in an insurgency. The purpose 
of this order set was to model “conventional combat” between the opposing forces, 
without attempts being made at genocide or intentional damage to the infrastructure of 
hostile tribes. 
In the “rampage” COA, units primarily attack the infrastructure of hostile tribal 
groups, although forces capable of indirect fire continue to do so. The U.S./U.N. forces 
try to protect all local infrastructure. The purpose of this order set is to represent irregular 
forces attacking hostile tribes to drive them out of an area, but stopping short of genocide.  
In the “genocide” COA, tribal units intentionally attack the civilian population of 
hostile tribes. U.S./U.N. forces try to prevent genocide. This order set represents the 
worst-case scenario. In fact, when this was run, the scenario cut out before the full 50 
turns because the population was reduced to less than zero in some grid squares, causing 
a program fault. 
There was time for one more set of orders, so a combination named “genocide 
half” was run. In this order set, the Rizeigat and Arab faction units attacked the 
population of the Messiria and Fur ethnic groups, while the U.S., Messiria, and Fur tried 
to protect local populations from genocide. Messiria and Fur forces also made 
conventional attacks against the genocidal military forces. 
3. Experiment Design 
Of note, all experiments for this thesis used the SEED Center version of PSOM 
2.6.2.3. Other versions of PSOM may have different results. 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the transient behavior of the measures 
of effectiveness over a large number of turns. In order to perform a detailed analysis, 10 
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items were chosen to vary, expected to be the most influential data inputs. These were the 
Rules of Engagement and Combat Firepower rating for each of the five sides being 
analyzed in the simulation, the U.S., Arab, Fur, Rizeigat, and Messeria. The ROE and FP 
variables were set to integers from 1 to 5 for the runs, these being all values allowed by 
PSOM. 
A total of 513 design points varying the FP and ROE for each faction (see 
Appendix A) were run for each of the six COAs of Table 2. This comes from augmenting 
a 512-design point NOAB with the base case scenario. This gave a total of 3078 design 
points. Running the simulations took about 18 hours on the 40-core SEED Center cluster. 
Originally it was hoped to “mix and match” the different order sets, however with five 
factions and five order sets, we would have had to run all the combinations of the model 
5^5 or 3125 times. Given that six runs (the five original order sets, plus one hybrid date 
set) took about 18 hours, fully saturating the combination space of order sets was 
infeasible. The simulation output is a table with 999691 rows and 27 columns showing 
the security value for each ethnic group, and the consent of each ethnic group toward 
each faction, on a scale of 0 to 10.  
In addition to the large experiment described above, smaller experiments were 
conducted for other purposes. The first tests the importance of the stochastic mode by 
using 21 runs of the same scenario to see if results differ. The second tests the importance 
of the starting consent values by using six runs each of two scenarios with both +1/-1 
difference from the starting values, and inputting the ending values of the first set of runs 
as starting values for the second set. 
In addition to yielding the overall change in consent and security values from the 
beginning to the end of the simulation runs, the experiments provide detailed output of 
these measures at each turn. This allows an exploration of the time required for the 
scenario to settle out.  
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
Previous analyses of PSOM have focused on discrete time results, showing the 
effect of a set of inputs at the end of some number of turns, however it is interesting to 
look at the changes over time. To do this, the data are put into the JMP statistical analysis 
software to analyze curves, both aggregate and discrete. An advantage of graphical 
analysis is that patterns can become more apparent when looked at visually. Also, a large 
number of data points can be looked at simultaneously, and in comparison to each other. 
A. STOCHASTIC EFFECT TEST 
If the primary output is going to be the value of consent toward certain groups, 
then the quality of consent outputs becomes very important. The PSOM literature 
available suggests that the effect of clicking the “Run in Stochastic Mode” button is 
minimal.47 In order to determine to what extent the stochastic mode affects the consent 
output values, the withdraw course of action was run in batch mode for 20 turns (from 
turn 2 to turn 21). The batch run was 20 runs (0–19), using a stochastic seed of 
635111537504469554. The reason the batch started with turn 2 was that turn 1 was used 
to set starting parameters, and I wanted to make sure these were not accidentally reset. 
Surprisingly, as far as consent output was concerned, there was no effect. A 
snippet of the raw data shows this in Figure 2. Whether looking at run 1 or run 20, each 
item in each column is the same. This finding was confirmed using statistical functions in 
JMP and Excel. 
  
                                                 
47 Marlin, “Ascertaining Validity in the Abstract Realm,” 53. 
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Figure 2.  Raw data from test of stochasticity of PSOM consent values 
 
 
After looking at the results of the initial run and seeing that all the results were 
identical, I wanted to make sure that the batch run was not just re-using the starting seed 
for each run; which would result in 20 identical runs. The same scenario was run in batch 
mode using a different seed (035125298889949632). Because this was just determining 
the effect of adding a different seed to the final results, I used a single run to verify that it 
was not different from the original batch. 
This suggested that stochastic mode would not affect my results, which greatly 
decreased the run time for the full experiments and subsequent analysis. However, the 
question immediately arises as to why stochastic mode is included if it does not have an 
effect. Well, it has an effect, but not on consent values. 
To verify this, I ran my combat course of action in another batch of 20 runs of 20 
turns (using a seed of 635381950076055390), and looked at the results of the “inter unit 
contact” for the first unit. The results are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3.   Combat losses from two different stochastic settings 
 
 
Note that Att means Attacker, and Def means Defender. 
 
As you can see in Table 3, it was immediately clear that different combats were 
occurring, that different casualties were inflicted (the idea of 0.66 deaths or 0.303 deaths 
is interesting), and that the one recorded random number generation, “Att Deterrence 
Roll,” was different. All of these conflicts were by Fur Large Squad 2 against various 
Rizeigat units. 
The question then was, did those different casualties affect consent values? I 
pulled the consent values the same way as above, and again there were no differences 
between the results for the different runs.  
B. INITIAL TRANSIENT ANALYSIS 
This experiment design was intended to test whether in a given scenario and order 
set, there was a stable value. In theory, if the situation is not changing, the happiness (and 






Size  Def Unit Name
 Def 
Contact 










1 3 5 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 52.30708 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.5539376 0 0.6552668
1 3 6 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 53.39589 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.6130238 0 1.08881
1 3 7 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 55 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.550519 0 1.09996
1 4 5 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 53.90004 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.1637481 0 0.5041496
1 4 6 1 10 Mounted Squad 1 59 Control/Stabilise - Guard Resources 1 0.1740093 0 0.3035237
1 4 6 2 10 Mounted Squad 1 58.69648 Control/Stabilise - Guard Resources 1 0.1362866 0 0.3029689
1 4 6 3 10 Mounted Squad 1 58.39351 Control/Stabilise - Guard Resources 1 0.8935525 0 0.3024142
1 4 6 4 10 Mounted Squad 1 58.09109 Control/Stabilise - Guard Resources 1 0.0625357 0 0.3018597
1 4 7 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 51.65181 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.9864367 0 1.076584
1 5 5 1 10 Mounted Squad 5 56.87943 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.7346215 0 1.11291
1 5 6 1 10 Mounted Squad 5 58 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.387695 0 1.120572






Size  Def Unit Name
 Def 
Contact 










1 3 5 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 55 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.5399455 0 0.6666425
1 3 6 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 50.08184 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.5596483 0 1.065487
1 3 7 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 52.736 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.4107186 0 1.084197
1 4 5 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 50.57522 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.1404748 0 0.493377
1 4 6 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 53.23802 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.05490083 0 0.502019
1 4 6 2 10 Mounted Squad 1 59 Control/Stabilise - Guard Resources 1 0.2852457 0 0.3035237
1 4 7 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 51.65181 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.7106985 0 1.076584
1 5 5 1 10 Mounted Squad 4 54.33336 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.9937957 0 1.095337
1 5 6 1 10 Mounted Squad 5 58 Attack/Enforce - Clear 1 0.3812512 0 1.120572
1 5 7 1 10 Tribe Group 1 30 Attack/Enforce - Ambush - Direct Fire 1 0.5764894 0 0.6665636
1 5 7 2 10 Tribe Group 1 30 Attack/Enforce - Ambush - Direct Fire 1 0.06855971 0 0.6665636
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In order to test this, the initial consent values determined by the scenario 
designers were run for 50 turns, resulting in what appeared to be a stable value. 
C. INITIAL VALUE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
There were a few interesting questions involved in the determination of a final 
stable value, both related to how variations in the starting value would affect the final 
value. One is how a limited, defined change in the initial value would change the final 
consent value, and the other was how stable the final value would be if fed back into the 
simulation and run again. In theory, if there were a stable value, then feeding the stable 
value in as a starting consent value should result in no change. 
Two scenarios were chosen to develop these baseline numbers and test them. In 
one all sides protected their own population—the “protect” scenario. In another all 
military forces withdrew from combat entirely—the “withdraw” scenario. The initial 
values for consent were drawn from what the original scenario designers input. To test 
how sensitive to defined changes in initial values these numbers were, they were varied 
by exactly one point up and down. The simulations were run with these three sets of input 
consent values and these two scenarios for 50 turns, and the final values were determined. 
These show as the three sets of lines under “P” and “W” (for patrol and withdraw 
scenarios) in Figure 3. 
While the changes clearly dropped off with time, the question remained as to 
whether the consent values were converging toward approaching a natural (steady state) 
value, or whether the effects of the unit actions were decreasing over time, i.e., “what 
have you done for me lately.” The original starting value resulted in certain final values, 
and these were fed back into the scenario, again with an increase and decrease by one, 
which show in Figure 3 under “PE” and “WE.” These results were very useful in 
determining the nature of the increase. 
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Figure 3.  Rizeigat consent toward other factions by scenario 
 
 
As you can see by the graphs in Figure 3, what at first appears to be a reversion to 
a mean is not. Re-inputting the value after 50 turns as a new starting value did not result 
in a steady state at the value it had settled into in the prior simulation, but instead the 
value dropped again in approximately the same way. 
In Figure 3, the clearest changes are for the Fur, Messeria, and Rizeigat consent 
values. Table 4 shows these results, with the consent change observed over 50 turns 
shown in the rightmost column. 
It is worth noting that while the ending values (for scenario P and W) were 
plugged into the model to create new starting values (for scenario PE and WE), there is 
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not an exact match. For example, the W scenario ending value was 5–2.432659 or 
2.567341, but the starting value for the WE scenario was 2.617273. When I went back to 
the starting data, there were small changes between the ending value of the original 
scenario, and the starting value fed into the second set (PE and WE). This may be related 
to the difference between starting at turn 1 or turn 2, but it does not appear to cause any 
change in the conclusions that can be drawn from the results. 
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Table 4.   Rizeigat population consent changes toward each faction by 
scenario 
Type Case Faction Start End Change 
P Base Fur 7 5.27644 1.723556 
PE Base Fur 5.34181 3.54426 1.797548 
W Base Fur 7 5.68103 1.318974 
WE Base Fur 5.73013 4.30721 1.422916 
P MinusOne Fur 6 4.17954 1.820458 
PE MinusOne Fur 4.34181 2.68666 1.655146 
W MinusOne Fur 6 4.58162 1.418377 
WE MinusOne Fur 4.73013 3.36015 1.369979 
P PlusOne Fur 8 6.56943 1.430571 
PE PlusOne Fur 6.34181 4.53541 1.806395 
W PlusOne Fur 8 6.92774 1.072265 
WE PlusOne Fur 6.73013 5.37124 1.35889 
P Base Messeria 8 5.44818 2.551821 
PE Base Messeria 5.61725 2.77206 2.845195 
W Base Messeria 8 6.10054 1.899458 
WE Base Messeria 6.21987 3.91571 2.304163 
P MinusOne Messeria 7 4.11131 2.888694 
PE MinusOne Messeria 4.61725 2.04257 2.574687 
W MinusOne Messeria 7 4.77144 2.228565 
WE MinusOne Messeria 5.21987 2.99296 2.226911 
P PlusOne Messeria 9 7.29227 1.707725 
PE PlusOne Messeria 6.61725 3.69223 2.925027 
W PlusOne Messeria 9 7.78764 1.212356 
WE PlusOne Messeria 7.21987 5.03904 2.180832 
P Base Rizeigat 5 2.04769 2.952305 
PE Base Rizeigat 2.09959 0.64029 1.459304 
W Base Rizeigat 5 2.56734 2.432659 
WE Base Rizeigat 2.61727 1.09067 1.526603 
P MinusOne Rizeigat 4 1.46509 2.534909 
PE MinusOne Rizeigat 1.09959 0.30815 0.79144 
W MinusOne Rizeigat 4 1.87166 2.128344 
WE MinusOne Rizeigat 1.61727 0.62452 0.992756 
P PlusOne Rizeigat 6 2.78598 3.214015 
PE PlusOne Rizeigat 3.09959 1.03647 2.063121 
W PlusOne Rizeigat 6 3.41282 2.587179 
WE PlusOne Rizeigat 3.61727 1.63676 1.980511 
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The author had also considered the possibility that the change in consent values 
would be stable; however, these data also show this not to be the case. The original 
reduction in consent of the Rizeigat in the withdraw scenario with base starting consent 
was from 5 to 2.56, a reduction of 2.43, but the reduction from 2.61 was only to 1.09, a 
drop of only 1.52. However, what is verifiable and significant is that as the starting 
consent value approaches 6 from above or below, the change in consent is maximized. 
Since the reason for the above analysis was to help future users of PSOM chose 
optimal starting consent values, and understand what the changes during the simulation 
were for, the author decided to seek input from the designers of the program. An email 
forwarded to the author from Nathan Hanley, one of the creators of PSOM, describes 
how one of two methods can be used to set the starting security values.48 The first is to 
use code or the GUI to directly set the starting values. The other is to “Run to 
Equilibrium” which is essentially what was demonstrated with consent above. According 
to an email from another expert on the program, Stephen Upton,49 the parameter is not 
initially set, but is calculated based on casualties incurred. 
Another important consideration was how the initial consent values affected the 
results. While the simulation determined changes to inputs each turn, the initial values 
were based on the considered judgment of subject matter experts. Looking at the output 
as a graph by turn gave a distinct nonlinear indication. It appeared that the consent values 
were converging to a specific value (different for each combination of two factions). In 
the case of the U.S. that mean was approaching 10 (maximum consent), as shown in 
Figure 4. Note that Figure 4 was created using all combinations of the inputs used to 




                                                 
48 Nathan Hanley, email message to author, June 25, 2013. 
49 Stephen Upton, email message to author, April 17, 2013. 
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Figure 4.  Variations in consent toward U.S. based on initial values 
 
 
In the above experiment, the initial values were varied by increasing or decreasing 
all values by 1. This led to at least one interesting result that needs to be watched for in 
future analysis. The Messeria tribal consent toward the U.S. is the one group that did not 
uniformly increase toward 10, The two trials where the consent was unchanged or 
increased did go to 10, but the trial where the starting consent was reduced by 1 led to an 
ending consent of 5. Digging into the source of this result gives us Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Messeria tribe consent toward the U.S. by turn, sorted by initial 
consent and scenario type 
 
 
Because the scenarios tended towards final values, it seemed valuable to run the 
scenarios for 50 turns to develop those values, and feed them back in as initial values. 
Because the U.S. consent invariably tended towards 10, this meant that the PE and WE 
scenarios had starting consent towards the U.S. of 10. The original scenarios had much 
lower consent values, and after subtracting 1 from them, the values became 0. In both the 
“P” and “W” scenario, this was the case, and the Messeria consent towards the U.S. 
started at 0 and barely increased. 
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Table 5.   Consent change by scenario type and starting consent 
Type Case Faction Start End Change 
P Base U.S. 1 9.9413433 8.9413433 
P MinusOne U.S. 0 0.0000005 0.0000005 
P PlusOne U.S. 2 9.9730038 7.9730038 
PE Base U.S. 6.63812 9.9969198 3.3588039 
PE MinusOne U.S. 5.63812 9.9953132 4.3571974 
PE PlusOne U.S. 7.63812 9.9980861 2.3599702 
W Base U.S. 1 9.9887912 8.9887912 
W MinusOne U.S. 0 0.0000026 0.0000026 
W PlusOne U.S. 2 9.9948965 7.9948965 
WE Base U.S. 6.66123 9.999431 3.3382009 
WE MinusOne U.S. 5.66123 9.9991445 4.3379144 
WE PlusOne U.S. 7.66123 9.9996464 2.3384164 
Note: end values near zero are highlighted and bold. 
I strongly recommend that in the future, researchers exploring variations on initial 
consent use a percentage of current value, or use 0.1 as a floor value instead of 0, to 
prevent this problem. In a conversation with Stephen Upton, Mary McDonald, and 
Nathan Hanley, experts familiar with the internal workings of PSOM, it was revealed that 
the program converts the initial 0–10 scale into a nonlinear scale (–infinity to +infinity), 
with the result that a starting value of 0 cannot be moved significantly towards a higher 
number. 
Inputting a 10 into the starting value may not result in the same problem. In the 
WE scenario, the Dinka consent towards the U.S. started at 10, dropped to 9.999996212, 
and then went back up to 10. Also, while consent toward a faction has been observed 
dropping to 0 in visual displays, it would be difficult for it to be truly zero on the scale, so 
it would still be able to move back up with proper inputs. It appears that only a hard-
coded zero causes this problem. 
Figure 6 shows that the consent levels move towards a steady state over time. The 
curve changes rapidly at first, and then slows down as the steady state is approached, 
which resembles a quadratic curve or (inverse) logarithmic curve. 
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Figure 6.  Consent toward different factions smoothed lines 
 
 




Looking at Figure 7, almost all Arab data points are on a single line. The Dinka 
have a number of quadratic lines, and at least one set of points at zero, the Messeria fill 
all area below a quadratic line, and the Rizeigat are a simpler version of the Dinka. 
However, the behavior of the Fur is especially interesting. To look at it more closely, see 
Figure 8. 
Figure 8.  Consent toward U.S. by Fur, and smoothed consent values, for the 
513 different simulated scenarios 
 
 
In most of the scenarios, the line drops to zero, then rises to 10, seemingly 
skipping the intermediate consent values. But the behavior of the Genocide and Half 
Genocide (Rizeigat and Arab factions committing Genocide against the Fur and 
Messiria), you see even odder behavior. In some scenarios, the consent value is ten, and 
in other combinations of ROE, Force Protection, etc., the consent value is zero! This 
sometimes causes the smooth line to show in places other than zero or ten, but the vast 
majority of consent values reported are at one of the extremes. 
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However, the use of the smoothing line has value, as it gives a visual indication of 
how many of the consent values are at ten vs how many are zero.  
Looking at the results by U.S. ROE (see Figure 9) and Force Protection did not 
fully explain the results. Clearly, there are some differences: the higher the U.S. ROE, the 
more consent ticks upwards. In this particular case, this means that populations suddenly 
switch from hating the U.S. to totally trusting the U.S. forces (note that despite the 
smooth line slowly rising, the data points are almost always either at zero or at ten). 
Figure 9.  Fur consent toward U.S. by U.S. ROE (with smoothed line) 
 
 
It is worth mentioning that the reason that the Genocide scenario does not go to 
50 turns is that at 27 turns some population values, in some of the test runs, went negative 
(different genocide scenario test runs did this on different turns). This meant that the 
population of at least one ethnic group in one region was completely wiped out. This did 
not happen in the Half-Genocide scenario, so it was probably an Arab or Rizeigat 
population that was destroyed, but it reveals how much the populations can be affected. Is 
it possible that the population is being reduced to a number that the U.S. is better able to 
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protect? If you look at the Fur ROE, you can see that it strongly affects the consent value 
(Figure 10). 
Figure 10.  Fur consent toward U.S. based on Fur ROE (with smoothed line) 
 
 
As you can see, a low Fur ROE leads to low U.S. consent, which is probably 
driven by a lack of perceived security, as shown in Figure 11. 
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So the stronger the Fur response, the more secure their population feels. I do not 
know for sure if this is because a stronger Fur response is more visible to the population, 
or more effective. However, if you look at the lower numbers for Fur response, you will 
see that the scenario does not run for as many turns, which indicates the complete 
depopulation of at least one area by the genocide (as discussed earlier, when the 
population reached zero and further genocide was ordered, it created a negative value 
fault that ended the run). In the areas with higher Fur response, the simulation continued, 
which suggests that the units were considered to have actually been more effective at 
protecting the population, not just looking good to the locals. 
Note that the number of rows is not an even multiple of the design points. Some 
runs terminated early due to genocide reducing population numbers to negative values, 
also see next paragraph. 
In order to run parallel plots of the data, the consent and security values of the 
initial turn were subtracted from turn 20 to produce a difference. This revealed something 
disturbing about the data. While every design point had output for the initial turn, some 
design points were missing output from the 20th turn. Specifically, design points 317 and 
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476 of the combat AR COA, 391 of the half genocide COA, and design points 10, 75, 76, 
101, 202, 282, 311, 317, 318, 350, 351, and 358 for the protect COA. This is different 
from the early termination of Genocide runs, and merits further investigation in the 
future. 
The design points with partially incomplete output and the associated starting FP 
and ROE values, taken from Appendix A, are listed in Table 6. 




There does not seem to be a pattern to the missing data. Looking at the original 
data set, while turn 0 had 21546 lines of data, turns 1–20 only had 21441, turns 21–23 
had 20650, turns 24 and 25 had 19873, turn 26 had 19229, and all remaining turns had 
only 17850 lines of data. Likewise, there should have been identical numbers of data 
points for each case (COA), however while combat and rampage had 183,141 lines of 
data, combat AR only had 182,441, genocide half had 182,791, protect 178,941, and 
genocide only 89,236. 
D. OUTPUT ANALYSIS 
A parallel plot, such as that in Figure 12, can provide additional insights about the 
output of the runs. A parallel plot displays one line for each run, and shows several result 
values using that line. By having several lines, you can compare multiple result values by 
Cases DP UN_ROE UN_FP Rizeigat_ROERizeigat_FPMessiria_ROEMessiria_FPFur_ROE Fur_FP Arab_ROE Arab_FP
Protect 10 4 5 3 4 1 2 1 3 1 2
Protect 75 1 3 1 1 5 4 1 3 3 1
Protect 76 1 5 3 5 4 2 1 4 5 1
Protect 101 1 4 1 2 5 4 3 4 4 5
Protect 202 3 2 5 2 4 2 2 2 4 5
Protect 282 1 5 1 1 4 3 1 3 3 1
Protect 311 2 3 3 2 5 4 3 4 2 1
Prot/Com AR 317 5 1 5 1 1 2 4 3 1 4
Protect 318 5 3 3 5 1 1 4 3 5 5
Protect 350 1 5 5 3 4 5 5 5 4 4
Protect 351 5 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 3 2
Protect 358 3 1 1 4 2 2 1 1 2 1
Genocide Half 391 2 3 2 2 2 5 2 5 1 2
Combat AR 476 3 1 2 2 2 4 5 5 3 3
 50 
comparing the lines, which can uncover information about relationships that otherwise 
would be hard to perceive. 
In Figure 12, the change in consent and security values between turn 20 and the 
initial value is shown for the full 513 design-point set. Note that since the value is “final 
minus initial,” lines at the top represent an improvement and lines at the bottom represent 
the value getting worse. To make the plot more informative, the six starting scenarios are 
color-coded. What is interesting is that most of the results fall into narrow bands, 
suggesting that a small change in force protection or ROE does not create a large change 
in output. Instead, the increases tend to be for the same amount for many different input 
values. The exception is the AR Combat scenario’s effect on the U.S. and Arab consent. 
Figure 12.  Parallel plot of consent and security values by case 
 
Colors by case: Protect Green, Genocide Red, Half Genocide Pink, Rampage Gray, 
Combat Blue, Combat AR Purple 
Figure 13 shows the same parallel plot of consent changes, but this version has 
colors by Arab ROE. As you can see, the Arab ROE has an explanatory effect on the 
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Arab consent value. Note that the red color is displayed last, so it is covering much of the 
green, blue, purple, and yellow results. 
Figure 13.  Parallel plot of consent changes by Arab ROE 
 
Graph colors are Green for ROE 1, Blue for ROE 2, Purple for ROE 3, Yellow for ROE 
4, and Red for ROE 5. Note that ROE 5 was displayed last and is covering some of the 
lines of other colors. 
Note that color coding the ROE on the parallel plots makes them much more 
informative. Alternatively, taking subsets of the data would allow specific ROEs to be 
considered in more detail. A similar plot of U.N. ROE did not result in useful 
information; the data points for the last ROE covered mostly the same points as the other 
ROE settings. Similarly, U.N. FP did not yield useful information in a parallel plot.  
E. STABLE VALUE IDENTIFICATION 
So if changes to consent values gradually approach a mean and stay there, how 
long does the system have to run to effectively reach the stable value? In other words, at 
what point does running the scenario cost resources that provide no new information of 
value? By running the Rampage scenario for 100 turns, I was able to get 8217 (1161 
population units times seven faction consent values each) columns of data. 
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MSER (short for mean squared error reduction, or (minimum) mean squared error 
rule) is a method of finding the initial run needed for output data to stabilize before 
running experiments.50 PSOM consent values, like many other statistical values that 
change over time, can be affected by the starting value. Using a MSER analysis can find 
out how many time elements it takes for this effect to diminish to near zero. MSER works 
by starting at the end of a data set (in this case, turn 100) where the data are assumed to 
be in steady state. It steps back through the data, adding earlier turns to the “included” set 
until such inclusion results in a sufficiently large increase in the mean square error 
estimate. Professor Paul Sanchez provided a ruby program called mser.rb that applies 
MSER to one or more output files, and can be used to construct a confidence interval for 
the mean response. The mser.rb program provides a number of turns to keep, but we want 
to find out the number of turns to discard, which we can call turn_s (for stable point). As 
an example, Table 7 shows the result from a single column, and Figure 14 is a graph of 
the corresponding consent values. The results from mser.rb are x-bar = -0.409100 and n = 
70, so the chosen truncation value for this run is turn_s = 100–70 = 30. Although the 
overall magnitude of the change is small (less than 1% of the stable value), the fact that 
there is zero change in consent beginning with turn 31 means that MSER is able to 
distinguish very minor differences, and truncate appropriately at turn_s = 30. 
  
                                                 
50 Paul J. Sánchez and K. Preston White, Jr., “Interval Estimation Using Replication/Deletion and 
MSER Truncation,” in Proceedings of the 2011 Winter Simulation Conference, ed. Sanjay Jain et al. 
(Piscataway, NJ: IEEE Press488. 
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Table 7.   Sample of consent values that stabilize quickly 
 
 
Figure 14.  Graph of consent values that stabilize quickly  
  
 
Looking at the detailed data, a number of design points yield results that are either 
actually or effectively unchanging by the end of the simulation. 258 columns of data were 
filled with nothing but zeros, clearly, they were already settled. Another 5946 of the 8127 
columns had no variation in the consent value (it was the same number each turn for the 
entire simulation). If you remove the consent values that were 0 or did not change over 
the 100 turns the scenario was run, you are left with 1,923 consent values that did change 
over time, and these show an average turn_s value of 22.49 with a standard deviation of 
only 5.30. Figure 15 shows the counts for the number of columns associated with each 
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turn_s truncation value, and what percentage of population units’ faction consent values 
would not be in stable settings if you used that turn_s. As you can see, even turns 26 and 
27 have a lot of data points, but by turn 30, you have almost certainly reached the stable 
value. 




























PSOM and other peacekeeping/population influence programs provide something 
traditional wargames do not. As the Anbar Awakening showed us, winning the hearts and 
minds of the locals is the true path to victory in an insurgency or ethnic conflict. Models 
for the attitudes of the local population, for how our actions affected the local population, 
and their perception of our forces, help us choose the strategies that can win the war, as 
opposed to battles. A battle that kills a thousand foes, and creates five thousand, is not a 
victory no matter how one-sided our casualties are. But with PSOM we can win the 
victories of infrastructure repair, rebuilding cities, making the population feel that their 
society is just, safe, and that they are being listened to. This is how we win a lasting 
peace. 
But while PSOM can be beneficial for a military planner either evaluating a future 
area of operations, or seeking to develop a training simulation for officers and leaders, 
there are a number of issues that analysts should be aware of when using the simulation. 
Thought should be put into determining the starting values of consent, initial population 
feelings about how secure they are, and even such questions as how large map grid 
squares should be. It is also important to note that changes in consent drop off by time, 
showing a “what have you done for me lately” effect. 
Consent values in the simulation are displayed from zero to ten, but represent an 
internal nonlinear scale from negative infinity to infinity. Because of this, the change in 
consent, or the percent change in consent, may be better indicators of whether a plan was 
successful in achieving the desired goals than the numerical consent value at the end of 
the simulation. This also means that there is no need to expend major resources getting an 
exact idea of how different groups feel about the actors in a conflict. A good guess is just 
as useful, allowing you to see how different strategies might affect the safety and 
goodwill of the local population. There is one important caveat. When setting initial 
consent for a training simulation, setting an area or even an ethnic group to zero consent 
could be problematic, as any group that has zero consent will never gain consent, 
however, for the same reason, this should not be used for a real world based simulation. 
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While there is a stochastic mode in PSOM, it affects combat values, not 
population responses. This means that while a mixed simulation (attempting to suppress 
an opposition/insurgent group through force of arms while depriving them of local 
support), might be worth running in stochastic mode and using multiple runs, if your 
primary measures of effectiveness are security or consent values, you can save time and 
effort by running PSOM in normal mode instead of stochastic mode. 
Also, by using MSER, it was determined that if the stances and combat modifiers 
are not changed for about 30 turns, the consent values will reach an equilibrium point. 
This can be useful in a few ways: First, it can be used to set starting consent values for a 
scenario where the factions are (before the scenario), relatively static or stalemated. Also, 
if you are using PSOM to simulate the effects of a particular set of actions by 
peacekeeping forces (and reactions by other factions), you only need to run the scenario 
for about 30 turns, not 50 or 100. A particularly conservative modeler might use turn 32 
or 33 given the slight variation in turns 31 and 32. Of course, depending on the scenario, 
30 turns could be 30 days or 30 months, and in the latter situation, it might not be realistic 
to assume that no other external events influence the populations’ stances.  
If these issues are taken into consideration, PSOM provides a reasonable option 
for simulating peacekeeping operations and should be the first stop for a military planner 
or trainer looking at future work in peacekeeping. With the instability in North Africa and 
the Middle East, this is a valuable tool.  
The research in this thesis explored a small number of scenarios in the contested 
Abyei region at the border of Sudan and South Sudan, with an eye toward providing 
general guidance to scenario builders. Further research could delve more deeply into the 
Abyei region model. For example, one possible future research topic would be looking 
into exactly which input points drove the output values in the parallel plot. Was it 
primarily the U.S. force protection and ROE that led to the consent values shown, or was 
it the settings of the tribal forces? Originally, 103 variables were identified to analyze, but 
only 10 were chosen due to the computational cost; selecting other variables and seeing 
how they affect the result would be a good future thesis topic. Also, this thesis only 
looked at all forces using the same strategy (with the exception of one that had half of the 
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forces attempting genocide, while the other used conventional warfare tactics). A 
simulation of different strategies, especially the U.S. options, would give information that 
would be very useful to U.S. planners. Also, while this thesis looked at how consent 
changed over time, this was done with a static strategy, seeing how consent changes if the 
strategy changed during turn 5, for instance, would be a useful expansion. Finally, PSOM 
could be compared with other peacekeeping models; it may be valuable to modify the 
approaches used in this thesis to assess the different platforms’ strengths and weaknesses, 
and evaluate their suitability for training or planning purposes. 
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APPENDIX A. MAIN MODEL NOAB DESIGN TABLE 
Table 8.   NOAB design for main model 
 
  








Fur_ROE Fur_FP Arab_ROE Arab_FP
1 5 5 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
2 3 2 1 2 2 2 5 2 2 2
3 2 3 5 1 5 5 5 2 3 1
4 1 3 5 2 2 1 3 5 1 1
5 2 1 1 3 2 3 1 5 1 1
6 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 2
7 1 5 1 2 3 2 1 2 1 1
8 1 3 5 2 1 1 1 1 5 2
9 5 1 1 1 4 1 3 1 2 1
10 4 5 3 4 1 2 1 3 1 2
11 4 4 1 1 1 4 2 1 4 1
12 1 1 1 4 1 3 3 5 1 1
13 1 2 5 5 2 2 2 2 3 2
14 3 1 5 5 1 5 2 5 1 4
15 1 3 2 5 5 1 1 4 5 3
16 1 2 1 5 2 5 1 5 2 5
17 2 2 2 4 3 5 2 1 5 2
18 2 4 1 4 1 3 5 1 5 5
19 5 2 1 5 4 5 2 5 1 3
20 4 5 5 5 2 1 4 5 2 3
21 5 3 1 2 3 5 3 3 4 4
22 3 4 1 1 4 3 3 1 3 4
23 1 2 4 1 3 2 2 5 5 4
24 3 1 2 3 4 3 4 4 5 5
25 4 4 4 1 1 2 1 4 2 4
26 2 5 5 4 1 2 3 3 5 3
27 5 1 2 5 5 5 4 2 4 2
28 2 1 3 4 2 3 4 1 5 5
29 3 1 1 1 2 2 1 4 1 2
30 5 5 4 1 3 3 4 1 5 2
31 1 5 3 1 5 2 4 5 5 1
32 3 5 2 1 3 3 3 2 2 3
33 1 5 5 2 2 1 5 2 5 2
34 3 3 2 2 5 2 4 2 4 3
35 4 5 1 1 1 4 5 2 2 1
36 4 5 1 5 4 3 3 5 2 1
37 4 1 4 4 2 2 3 1 2 5
38 1 5 4 4 2 3 4 4 1 2
39 3 1 4 5 1 2 4 3 5 2
40 5 4 1 2 3 4 5 5 3 3
41 4 2 2 5 2 5 2 5 5 2
42 4 1 5 3 4 3 5 2 1 3
43 2 3 1 5 1 3 2 4 4 5
44 5 5 5 3 2 1 3 1 5 2
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Fur_ROE Fur_FP Arab_ROE Arab_FP
45 2 4 3 4 1 3 1 5 4 1
46 4 2 2 5 4 1 1 5 5 3
47 3 2 5 2 4 3 3 2 1 5
48 1 3 2 4 3 4 2 1 3 1
49 5 4 2 1 1 3 3 5 5 2
50 4 1 5 2 5 5 3 4 1 5
51 2 1 1 4 4 1 5 1 5 5
52 2 2 5 2 1 2 1 5 2 5
53 1 3 5 5 5 3 2 5 1 4
54 5 2 4 1 4 3 1 1 2 1
55 5 2 1 4 2 1 3 1 2 2
56 5 1 2 1 1 4 3 1 1 1
57 1 3 4 5 4 5 5 5 2 4
58 4 1 1 4 5 3 2 3 2 3
59 3 2 5 2 5 1 4 2 2 3
60 2 5 3 1 3 1 1 4 2 3
61 5 2 2 4 3 1 5 4 1 1
62 3 4 2 1 1 5 3 4 2 5
63 1 1 3 4 1 3 2 1 5 4
64 3 1 5 1 2 4 4 3 5 1
65 4 3 4 5 2 1 5 3 4 2
66 2 1 3 3 5 1 5 1 1 3
67 2 4 3 5 1 3 3 5 2 1
68 4 4 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
69 1 2 1 2 1 4 3 4 4 5
70 2 3 3 1 2 2 2 1 5 2
71 1 1 5 2 5 1 2 2 5 5
72 5 1 5 2 2 5 4 4 4 5
73 2 1 1 2 4 1 5 1 3 3
74 5 4 3 5 3 3 1 1 1 4
75 1 3 1 1 5 4 1 3 3 1
76 1 5 3 5 4 2 1 4 5 1
77 1 2 4 1 1 1 4 5 3 1
78 5 5 2 2 2 1 5 3 1 3
79 1 3 1 1 5 3 3 5 2 5
80 2 5 5 1 4 5 2 4 1 1
81 4 3 5 1 3 5 2 2 4 1
82 4 2 4 1 5 2 5 3 4 3
83 2 4 4 1 1 1 1 2 5 2
84 1 4 3 4 1 5 1 4 1 3
85 3 2 5 1 1 2 2 2 3 4
86 2 3 2 5 2 4 4 4 4 1
87 2 4 5 1 1 3 1 1 2 5
88 2 2 1 1 2 3 5 5 1 3
89 4 5 3 4 4 2 2 5 3 1
90 1 4 1 3 3 4 1 2 3 4
91 5 3 1 2 4 1 2 5 3 1
92 1 3 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 2
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Fur_ROE Fur_FP Arab_ROE Arab_FP
93 2 4 4 4 2 1 2 5 1 3
94 4 1 3 2 5 4 1 3 1 4
95 4 1 3 4 5 1 1 2 2 4
96 2 1 3 2 4 3 5 3 3 1
97 3 5 2 5 5 2 1 1 5 4
98 5 3 1 4 5 3 4 3 5 1
99 2 5 4 3 2 4 2 5 4 4
100 2 5 2 4 5 3 5 1 1 5
101 1 4 1 2 5 4 3 4 4 5
102 2 4 1 4 3 5 4 5 4 1
103 4 4 5 1 1 3 5 5 2 2
104 5 5 3 2 3 3 1 5 4 4
105 4 5 1 5 4 4 4 5 4 1
106 3 4 2 4 2 3 2 2 5 5
107 1 4 5 4 1 2 2 2 5 3
108 4 1 1 4 5 4 2 1 2 5
109 1 4 5 4 3 4 1 3 2 2
110 5 5 3 5 3 4 2 4 2 5
111 2 2 3 2 1 3 2 4 5 4
112 4 5 5 2 1 2 2 4 3 5
113 5 2 3 5 4 4 1 2 5 4
114 1 3 2 4 5 4 3 4 2 1
115 5 5 1 1 1 4 5 2 2 5
116 2 3 5 4 2 1 4 1 3 3
117 3 1 3 4 5 1 2 2 3 1
118 4 3 5 2 3 4 4 3 2 3
119 4 4 4 2 4 2 5 4 2 3
120 3 1 2 4 2 5 5 1 4 1
121 2 5 5 4 1 3 3 4 5 5
122 1 3 1 2 3 1 5 1 3 2
123 5 3 2 2 5 3 5 3 5 3
124 4 5 4 1 2 4 2 1 3 3
125 3 1 4 5 3 3 5 2 2 2
126 1 5 4 5 4 4 3 2 2 1
127 1 2 1 3 2 2 4 4 3 4
128 4 4 2 1 3 5 1 4 2 1
129 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 4 2
130 5 5 4 2 4 1 2 3 5 5
131 1 5 5 2 5 2 1 5 4 3
132 3 3 3 2 3 3 1 2 3 3
133 4 1 5 3 5 1 2 5 2 1
134 1 4 3 4 3 5 4 3 3 1
135 3 5 3 2 4 2 3 3 4 5
136 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 5 4 3
137 3 2 1 4 1 2 1 5 3 2
138 3 1 1 2 5 3 5 1 1 2
139 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 5 3
140 1 2 4 1 5 5 3 2 5 1
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Fur_ROE Fur_FP Arab_ROE Arab_FP
141 1 3 1 1 4 4 5 4 3 1
142 5 4 2 5 1 3 4 2 4 4
143 1 2 4 3 2 1 3 2 1 4
144 2 1 1 1 2 5 1 3 4 5
145 1 5 1 3 2 1 4 2 5 4
146 5 1 4 3 5 3 4 1 5 5
147 4 1 4 5 2 2 1 5 2 4
148 2 1 3 4 1 1 2 3 4 3
149 5 4 5 1 2 2 1 2 5 5
150 4 4 1 2 1 2 4 1 4 4
151 4 5 1 5 2 3 4 3 1 3
152 3 2 3 1 2 1 5 1 1 1
153 5 3 3 2 5 3 2 1 4 1
154 3 3 2 5 3 2 2 2 4 1
155 3 5 5 2 4 3 5 3 3 1
156 4 5 2 5 2 3 5 5 5 3
157 1 2 5 5 1 1 4 3 1 2
158 5 4 4 2 2 5 2 5 5 1
159 5 3 3 1 5 1 1 3 1 5
160 4 2 4 5 2 3 3 2 3 1
161 1 4 5 2 5 3 2 2 5 2
162 4 1 2 4 4 2 3 5 3 1
163 2 3 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 4
164 1 4 1 2 3 3 3 5 1 3
165 4 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 2 3
166 1 5 2 4 3 4 1 4 5 2
167 3 1 2 4 4 1 3 1 3 3
168 2 1 5 3 4 3 2 1 5 5
169 1 1 3 1 3 2 3 3 5 3
170 1 2 1 4 5 1 5 5 2 4
171 1 1 3 3 2 1 5 4 5 2
172 2 2 3 3 4 2 5 5 4 3
173 4 4 1 4 2 1 5 5 3 5
174 5 1 2 5 5 2 5 4 2 5
175 5 4 3 4 1 5 3 1 1 5
176 3 2 2 4 3 4 2 3 4 2
177 4 4 2 3 5 1 3 3 5 5
178 5 4 2 2 3 2 2 3 4 2
179 4 5 1 1 2 4 2 3 3 3
180 2 5 5 4 2 3 1 4 2 4
181 4 2 1 2 5 3 2 4 1 1
182 2 1 1 2 2 1 4 5 3 5
183 5 1 2 3 1 5 5 4 3 3
184 1 4 2 1 4 3 5 3 5 5
185 1 3 1 4 5 2 2 4 1 5
186 5 1 4 1 2 2 2 3 2 1
187 3 4 2 2 5 2 2 5 1 1
188 2 5 1 2 1 4 5 5 3 3
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Fur_ROE Fur_FP Arab_ROE Arab_FP
189 3 3 3 5 5 5 2 4 1 5
190 3 3 5 1 5 5 2 2 4 4
191 1 3 1 3 4 1 4 2 3 5
192 1 2 3 5 1 3 4 3 1 4
193 2 4 3 5 1 1 5 3 5 4
194 2 1 5 5 4 4 2 4 4 2
195 3 1 1 3 5 2 4 4 2 5
196 3 3 3 5 3 4 5 1 5 5
197 4 5 4 3 4 5 3 5 3 3
198 2 3 2 1 5 1 4 5 4 4
199 2 5 2 2 4 1 4 2 1 4
200 1 4 2 3 1 4 4 4 5 4
201 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 5
202 3 2 5 2 4 2 2 2 4 5
203 5 5 4 2 2 2 5 5 4 2
204 5 3 5 4 2 2 3 2 2 3
205 2 1 1 2 1 4 1 4 1 5
206 2 3 3 5 2 2 2 4 3 1
207 4 1 4 1 3 1 1 3 1 4
208 4 2 1 4 1 2 2 3 2 4
209 3 4 5 5 1 1 5 1 4 1
210 4 2 3 3 2 2 1 2 3 2
211 2 5 1 5 1 1 4 2 3 4
212 5 1 3 2 3 2 5 4 4 5
213 2 5 4 1 4 1 1 5 4 5
214 1 3 1 2 5 1 1 1 4 1
215 5 4 2 2 2 3 3 5 3 3
216 3 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 2 5
217 5 3 5 1 3 1 1 5 5 4
218 5 2 4 3 3 1 4 2 1 4
219 2 4 4 4 2 4 5 1 1 1
220 3 1 4 2 2 5 5 5 5 3
221 5 5 5 3 4 5 2 2 1 5
222 5 5 3 3 1 2 2 3 4 3
223 2 1 3 1 1 5 4 2 5 2
224 3 4 5 5 4 1 5 2 1 2
225 1 1 4 4 3 5 5 1 3 1
226 5 3 5 1 2 4 5 2 3 3
227 1 3 4 2 2 1 1 4 3 5
228 4 4 5 1 2 2 1 5 5 5
229 5 5 2 4 1 4 3 3 1 5
230 2 1 5 3 4 3 2 2 4 5
231 1 5 4 5 5 1 3 2 1 2
232 5 2 3 1 2 1 3 2 4 1
233 4 4 2 5 5 5 2 3 1 2
234 2 2 2 4 1 3 1 4 1 4
235 3 1 1 4 1 4 1 3 2 4
236 3 4 3 3 3 3 1 5 5 5
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237 4 2 4 5 3 1 1 4 4 1
238 5 4 1 1 1 5 4 3 3 2
239 5 2 2 2 3 5 4 4 5 4
240 3 4 1 2 1 2 4 4 3 5
241 5 2 4 5 2 2 3 4 2 1
242 3 1 3 1 4 4 3 3 1 1
243 4 4 2 2 1 1 4 5 2 4
244 2 1 4 2 5 4 2 5 4 4
245 1 1 4 1 1 5 4 4 3 5
246 5 1 5 4 2 2 1 3 4 2
247 5 3 4 1 4 2 5 3 1 5
248 3 5 4 5 5 3 5 4 2 1
249 2 1 2 4 2 4 5 4 1 2
250 5 4 5 2 3 3 2 1 2 1
251 2 1 2 1 2 4 4 1 2 4
252 2 1 2 1 4 5 1 4 5 4
253 4 1 5 5 4 2 4 1 3 2
254 4 1 5 5 1 3 4 1 2 3
255 3 1 1 2 5 3 4 1 5 5
256 4 1 3 3 2 4 2 3 5 4
257 1 1 2 1 1 4 2 2 1 2
258 2 2 2 5 3 2 1 5 5 3
259 2 1 1 4 5 4 3 2 5 4
260 2 3 4 2 3 4 5 4 2 5
261 3 4 4 3 5 5 1 5 2 5
262 4 1 3 1 4 5 1 1 5 1
263 5 4 1 2 5 1 5 4 4 2
264 4 2 4 5 1 4 5 1 3 5
265 4 4 2 5 3 1 1 4 5 1
266 3 5 2 1 5 1 1 4 3 2
267 2 4 4 1 2 5 5 5 3 3
268 1 1 4 2 1 2 3 5 4 4
269 4 2 2 5 5 1 3 4 1 3
270 2 3 2 3 4 2 3 3 3 1
271 5 2 4 5 2 4 4 2 2 1
272 3 2 4 2 3 1 2 4 1 1
273 2 1 5 1 1 4 3 2 1 5
274 5 2 1 4 3 5 1 3 3 2
275 5 3 2 4 4 5 1 1 5 3
276 4 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 2
277 1 4 4 1 1 1 3 3 1 2
278 3 1 4 3 1 5 2 3 2 2
279 2 5 4 2 1 2 4 1 3 2
280 4 2 5 4 3 1 4 5 4 5
281 1 2 2 5 2 5 1 1 2 5
282 1 5 1 1 4 3 1 3 3 1
283 2 4 4 5 5 4 4 1 2 2
284 2 4 1 3 5 4 2 4 2 3
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285 2 5 3 3 5 5 1 2 2 5
286 3 3 5 3 5 3 1 2 2 2
287 2 4 3 5 5 4 4 2 3 2
288 4 4 4 3 5 2 2 1 5 5
289 3 5 3 3 5 2 3 2 5 1
290 4 2 3 5 1 5 2 3 1 1
291 1 4 5 3 1 5 5 3 1 5
292 1 3 4 2 2 1 4 5 3 3
293 2 3 4 5 5 2 2 3 3 1
294 3 5 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 2
295 4 5 1 4 3 5 5 4 2 4
296 5 5 4 5 1 4 3 3 4 5
297 4 5 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 5
298 5 2 5 5 4 3 4 4 1 1
299 2 5 1 2 3 1 4 3 1 4
300 4 5 2 5 3 3 5 1 1 5
301 5 4 4 1 4 2 5 4 3 2
302 5 4 1 5 1 3 1 3 3 1
303 1 3 5 3 3 5 1 3 3 1
304 5 4 1 4 2 4 3 3 1 5
305 3 2 3 3 1 2 4 1 4 1
306 2 2 4 5 4 1 3 1 4 1
307 5 5 5 4 4 2 3 1 3 5
308 4 5 5 2 5 2 5 1 3 2
309 1 4 3 1 4 4 4 1 2 1
310 1 2 5 5 3 2 4 1 5 1
311 2 3 3 2 5 4 3 4 2 1
312 5 1 3 3 1 5 5 4 4 4
313 5 3 1 2 4 5 3 5 5 5
314 5 5 5 3 2 2 1 1 2 3
315 4 2 5 2 1 3 5 5 1 4
316 2 2 2 5 1 2 5 2 3 5
317 5 1 5 1 1 2 4 3 1 4
318 5 3 3 5 1 1 4 3 5 5
319 5 5 5 4 3 5 1 1 3 3
320 1 5 1 1 5 3 4 1 4 5
321 1 1 4 2 1 2 2 3 1 5
322 2 3 2 1 4 4 3 2 2 5
323 5 2 4 1 3 1 5 2 1 4
324 1 5 5 3 1 2 3 3 1 4
325 2 5 1 4 1 5 1 2 4 5
326 1 3 2 5 2 1 2 2 4 4
327 4 1 2 4 2 2 5 2 1 3
328 1 2 5 4 1 2 1 4 5 2
329 3 5 1 5 3 5 4 2 4 2
330 5 4 5 5 4 5 1 5 3 3
331 4 2 5 3 3 1 1 4 3 2
332 5 4 4 3 1 5 2 1 2 4
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333 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 2
334 2 4 1 3 5 5 1 2 2 1
335 5 4 3 4 1 4 2 1 1 5
336 2 2 3 3 5 1 1 1 1 4
337 1 2 5 3 4 1 3 2 5 2
338 3 1 2 3 1 5 2 1 5 2
339 1 3 5 4 2 4 4 4 1 2
340 5 4 5 3 2 4 4 5 5 3
341 1 5 2 4 2 5 1 3 1 4
342 3 5 2 3 5 3 3 5 5 4
343 1 5 4 5 2 2 3 1 4 2
344 5 2 3 1 2 2 5 2 3 2
345 5 4 5 3 4 2 1 1 5 3
346 5 2 3 1 1 3 2 3 5 2
347 5 3 2 4 2 5 2 1 1 1
348 2 2 5 3 4 3 3 4 5 1
349 2 2 5 2 1 1 3 3 3 1
350 1 5 5 3 4 5 5 5 4 4
351 5 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 3 2
352 1 1 4 1 5 5 5 3 3 1
353 4 3 2 5 2 4 4 5 3 4
354 4 2 1 4 4 1 2 5 3 3
355 4 5 3 4 4 3 2 5 1 3
356 4 4 4 3 5 4 4 1 5 4
357 2 1 2 5 3 3 5 5 4 3
358 3 1 1 4 2 2 1 1 2 1
359 5 2 5 5 5 4 3 2 4 2
360 5 1 2 4 3 5 5 1 2 4
361 1 5 1 2 2 4 3 1 1 2
362 5 3 4 3 1 5 3 1 4 3
363 4 3 5 5 3 4 3 5 1 1
364 1 3 3 3 5 4 1 2 5 3
365 1 3 1 1 4 5 2 4 3 2
366 2 2 5 1 2 3 2 4 4 5
367 5 2 1 4 3 1 4 3 4 4
368 1 2 2 5 1 2 4 1 1 3
369 3 3 1 5 5 4 4 4 1 5
370 3 5 5 2 3 1 2 5 5 3
371 3 2 3 3 4 5 1 2 2 4
372 5 1 2 2 1 1 1 5 3 2
373 2 4 4 3 2 1 2 2 2 2
374 5 2 4 5 4 1 1 3 4 3
375 2 2 1 4 2 2 4 5 2 1
376 5 1 1 5 1 1 3 3 4 1
377 1 2 3 3 3 2 1 4 3 5
378 4 3 1 1 2 2 1 2 4 2
379 4 4 4 5 4 4 1 4 5 1
380 1 2 2 3 5 1 4 3 1 5
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381 2 3 1 3 1 3 2 1 2 4
382 2 5 2 3 3 4 1 1 4 5
383 3 1 4 3 1 2 4 5 4 3
384 3 2 2 5 1 1 3 3 2 2
385 3 2 3 3 5 1 2 2 3 2
386 4 5 4 5 5 4 3 5 1 5
387 1 4 1 4 3 3 4 3 5 3
388 4 5 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 3
389 5 3 4 5 4 4 5 2 1 2
390 1 4 4 4 5 2 2 5 5 2
391 2 3 2 2 2 5 2 5 1 2
392 4 5 3 3 5 2 5 1 3 1
393 3 1 5 3 5 3 2 4 2 4
394 1 3 5 5 4 4 1 3 1 5
395 4 2 1 5 1 1 3 4 5 5
396 2 5 2 1 4 2 3 3 1 4
397 1 4 3 3 1 2 4 3 3 4
398 3 3 2 2 4 4 1 1 4 4
399 4 2 5 2 5 1 3 4 1 3
400 4 3 3 5 5 1 1 1 4 5
401 3 2 2 3 5 1 3 1 2 3
402 5 4 4 3 1 5 4 3 5 3
403 5 3 1 1 4 3 2 2 2 3
404 3 3 3 5 2 2 5 5 3 4
405 2 1 2 3 5 1 4 4 5 4
406 3 2 4 5 2 1 2 5 2 5
407 5 5 2 3 2 5 1 2 4 2
408 4 1 4 2 2 3 4 4 5 1
409 2 2 3 2 5 1 5 1 1 2
410 5 4 1 2 3 2 2 5 2 5
411 5 1 1 4 5 3 4 5 1 2
412 1 2 3 5 3 2 5 5 3 3
413 1 2 4 2 4 3 3 5 4 3
414 2 3 2 1 3 4 5 2 3 4
415 1 4 5 4 2 5 5 4 4 3
416 3 5 1 4 2 3 5 5 4 1
417 3 1 5 2 1 3 3 2 3 2
418 2 5 5 1 4 2 3 5 2 3
419 4 2 1 5 5 3 5 3 2 4
420 4 1 3 2 4 4 2 5 5 1
421 1 5 3 5 3 5 2 3 3 4
422 4 2 2 1 3 3 4 2 1 1
423 3 2 5 2 4 1 3 5 2 3
424 1 1 3 5 5 5 5 3 3 5
425 4 2 3 4 5 2 5 3 4 4
426 1 1 3 3 1 4 2 1 2 4
427 3 2 5 1 4 5 1 4 2 4
428 1 4 1 5 1 4 3 1 5 2
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429 5 3 3 1 5 4 5 5 3 2
430 4 2 1 5 3 5 4 2 5 2
431 5 3 2 2 3 4 3 5 4 1
432 2 3 3 4 2 4 3 2 5 2
433 5 1 3 1 2 5 2 5 1 2
434 2 1 2 3 2 5 2 1 3 4
435 2 1 5 5 1 4 1 3 1 4
436 3 5 1 3 5 2 3 3 3 5
437 3 5 5 3 2 3 1 1 5 4
438 5 1 3 1 2 3 1 2 2 3
439 1 4 1 4 1 2 3 5 5 5
440 1 2 3 5 4 4 4 1 3 4
441 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 3 1 2
442 3 4 4 3 3 4 5 5 3 1
443 3 5 2 1 3 5 4 2 1 1
444 1 1 1 3 2 5 1 4 5 2
445 1 5 4 3 3 2 5 1 2 2
446 5 2 1 3 2 1 2 5 4 3
447 1 4 2 5 5 4 2 2 2 3
448 5 5 4 2 3 5 5 5 3 3
449 4 3 4 1 4 4 5 1 5 3
450 3 2 3 1 1 3 2 4 4 1
451 5 3 3 4 3 1 1 2 1 5
452 3 3 2 4 5 2 2 4 2 1
453 2 1 2 1 3 2 4 4 2 1
454 2 3 2 2 5 4 2 4 5 1
455 3 3 5 1 2 5 4 4 2 1
456 1 3 4 1 4 1 1 1 1 5
457 3 2 1 4 5 4 1 2 4 1
458 2 4 3 2 5 1 3 5 5 1
459 5 2 4 5 3 4 3 4 2 2
460 1 1 1 5 1 3 1 4 4 3
461 2 3 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 4
462 2 5 2 3 3 5 4 4 3 1
463 5 4 4 1 1 3 1 1 4 5
464 1 2 4 4 1 5 5 2 4 1
465 4 4 5 3 2 2 4 5 1 5
466 3 5 5 3 3 5 5 1 1 1
467 2 1 3 3 2 2 4 1 4 4
468 5 2 4 5 4 2 2 1 1 3
469 5 5 1 4 4 2 5 3 4 4
470 5 1 2 5 5 5 3 3 4 5
471 3 1 5 4 3 3 4 4 4 1
472 5 4 1 3 3 1 1 1 2 1
473 3 2 3 3 4 1 3 4 1 2
474 4 5 3 2 1 3 3 1 4 2
475 2 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 1 4
476 3 1 2 2 2 4 5 5 3 3
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477 2 3 3 2 2 5 5 5 1 5
478 3 2 1 5 1 5 3 4 2 1
479 5 2 4 2 5 4 5 1 3 4
480 5 5 2 4 3 1 1 2 2 2
481 4 3 1 5 5 2 3 5 4 2
482 3 3 2 1 3 3 5 2 1 2
483 1 2 2 1 3 4 1 1 3 2
484 3 5 2 3 2 2 5 1 4 5
485 2 1 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 5
486 1 2 1 4 4 1 4 4 3 4
487 1 5 1 1 3 2 5 5 2 2
488 4 1 5 3 2 5 1 4 2 3
489 5 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 2 2
490 5 4 2 4 3 1 1 5 1 1
491 3 1 5 5 4 1 2 3 3 4
492 1 5 3 4 1 1 5 1 4 1
493 2 2 1 3 2 5 3 4 2 2
494 4 5 2 5 3 1 2 1 5 5
495 5 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 3 3
496 3 1 4 1 5 4 1 4 1 3
497 5 3 3 2 3 3 2 1 5 5
498 1 3 2 2 4 1 2 3 5 2
499 1 2 5 4 5 2 2 2 2 4
500 3 4 5 2 1 1 5 2 1 5
501 1 4 5 4 4 5 5 3 5 2
502 1 5 4 3 2 4 2 1 3 2
503 3 5 2 3 4 2 2 5 3 4
504 5 1 2 3 5 2 2 5 5 5
505 2 2 5 5 4 4 1 3 2 4
506 5 2 4 3 2 5 4 3 4 3
507 4 1 3 1 5 3 5 2 5 3
508 5 2 2 4 1 5 1 1 3 1
509 3 3 2 5 2 3 1 3 5 1
510 1 4 3 4 4 5 5 1 5 3
511 3 2 2 4 1 3 1 4 4 1
512 4 1 3 1 4 2 4 4 2 3
513 3 3 5 1 1 2 5 5 5 2
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APPENDIX B. CREATING / EDITING SCENARIOS IN PSOM 
A. SETTINGS FILE 
First, even when creating a new scenario from scratch, an existing settings file 
will be edited. Most of the settings will not need to be changed anyway, but a few key 
items should be looked at. 
Figure 16.  Data and settings, population agents 
 
 
Under Population Agents, the People per Agent sets how large a group a single 
population agent represents. If you have a billion people, then a population agent size of 
one million might be better. If you were modeling a small area with only 100,000 people, 
a population agent size of 100 would work. As a rule of thumb, about 1000 agents is a 
good number to work with. Too few and you will be unable to have one population 
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outnumbering another in an area or be able to show population in sparsely populated 
areas. Too many and you will multiply your workload. The Sudan Scenario, modeling 
about 10 million people, had 1160 population agents of 10,000 people each. Even so, 
some desert areas with below 1000 population were considered “empty” for the 
simulation. 
Also under Population Agents, the Decision radius shows how large each map 
square will be. While each subsection of the map needs to be a square of this length on 
each side, the map itself can be a rectangle as long as it is made up of these squares. A 
map with one region would be nearly pointless, while a map with 10,000 regions would 
have a huge administrative cost for marginal improvement. A map with 100–200 regions 
seems to work well. 
The last item under Population Agents to look at is the Memory Coefficient, 
which determines how quickly a population agent (a group of people of a common ethnic 
group in a single region) will forget a positive or negative action against their ethnic 
group or an ally that they are aware of. 
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Figure 17.  Data and settings, unit abilities 
 
 
It can be useful to review, and possibly add to the Unit Abilities and possibly the 
Pre-Set Unit Types. Pre-Set Unit Types are categories of troops that can allow you to 
edit characteristics of the included units as a group. 
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Figure 18.  Data and settings, combat modifiers 
 
 
An area in the settings file that you need to consider is the Combat Modifiers. 
You should examine all of these numbers, but especially RoE and Force Protection. The 
former determines how much force military units will use in combat (collateral damage) 
which affects population security values, and consent values to a lesser extent. Force 
Protection determines how aggressive a force is to prevent potential hostiles from 
approaching; a higher number in this value means higher collateral damage, which will 
reduce population security.51 Note that unit ROE and Force Protection can be set to other 
values in the scenario editor for each unit. This allows a side to use a different value for 
some or all of their forces, or for different sides to have different combat rules. 
                                                 
51 Marlin, “Ascertaining Validity in the Abstract Realm,” 81–82. 
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Another important note is that the settings file can be switched out between turns 
of a scenario. Two possible uses of this would be either to try a scenario with different 
underlying values, or to change the population’s settings in the middle of a training 
simulation. The latter would allow the population to change their memory coefficient, or 
how long they remember positive and negative actions, in the middle of a scenario, 
forcing the officers being trained to react to this change. 
B. SCENARIO FILE 
The next step is the Scenario Editor itself. Some important points to consider are 
the difference between Factions and Ethnic Groups. Factions are the directed and active 
forces; they have military forces and are controlled by a player or trainer. Ethnic groups 
represent the passive populations; they are the objectives of the simulation. Factions can 
include both official governments and militia/rebel groups. 




Figure 20.  Scenario editor, ethnic groups 
 
 
After specifying the factions, you must set the Relationships. At first, this just 
seems to set who is fighting whom, but both the Share Intelligence and the Share Consent 
have important effects. Share Intelligence allows sides to share information about where 
hostile forces are located and what they are doing, but more importantly, the Share 
Consent allows a faction’s positive (or negative) actions to also affect the faction sharing 
consent. An example of this is if an Ethnic Group faction is seen as supporting the local 
government, their actions will increase or decrease support for the government. 
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Figure 21.  Scenario editor, relationships 
 
 
You will need to import your map of the area. As discussed before you will need 
it to be divisible into squares of the size determined by the settings file. In the Map tab 
set the width and height of the map, then set the terrain types. Then you will need to place 
the population by number and ethnic group. It is probably easier to set this by XML 
import, but it can be done via the GUI. The GUI can also be used to verify numbers or 
modify them. Note that you will want to set the population of an area as multiples of 
population agents, not as some in-between number (and remember that a population 
agent can only be one ethnic group). 
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Figure 22.  Scenario editor, map 
 
 
Once the population is placed, you will need to set the consent and security 
values. You can manually set them, but this means typing in two numbers for each of 
your 1000 or so agents. Instead, you can edit the XML files to set large numbers at a 
time. It is easy enough to set the consent values for all members of an ethnic group to a 
single value, which means putting in 10 or so numbers, but it is more difficult to edit the 
security values. Fortunately, the values start at 10. This is probably not the value you 
want at the start of a simulation that represents a conflict zone. If you do not correct this, 




Figure 23.  Edit population agents 
 
 
A potential solution is to set up your combat forces while using code 
manipulation to hold unit and population sizes constant. Then you can run the simulation 
for a period of time to allow the conflicts to change the security value organically, until it 
reaches an equilibrium state. Since this was suggested by one of the original 
programmers of PSOM, this should not have the problem that consent values have with 
the equilibrium state after several turns promptly changing when put back into a starting 
state. Of course, if you do not know how to do code manipulation in this way, another 
method would be to track the changes to the XML file, and then put the final security 
values into the initial file.  
Another important issue in PSOM is the economy. Entering values in every 
economy section is far too time consuming, copying information from one cell to another 
in the XML will save you a lot of time. Try to ensure, however, that the property and 
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construction in each region represents the population in that region (with the possible 
exception of “abandoned property,” belonging to a group forced out of their homes). 
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